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Abstract 
This thesis applies a Structural Vector Auto Regression model to find the response of economic 
growth to fiscal deficits in South Africa. The results of this study help to assess the effectiveness of 
discretionary fiscal policy in stimulating economic growth in this economy. Our study finds a 
negligible response of economic growth to fiscal deficits, for both the short-run and long-run, 
implying that discretionary fiscal policy is not an effective economic stimulatory policy in South 
Africa. Based on the analyses of the impulse response functions and the forecast error variance 
decompositions, we believe this finding could have been caused by: weak automatic stabilisers; the 
leakage of fiscal deficits through increased imports and the appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate - both of which lead to a trade deficit; the crowding-out of private investment; and 
finally, the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) compliance with the inflation-targeting monetary 
policy which could have offset the fiscal stimulus. These causes have both theoretical and empirical 
support for the impotence of fiscal deficits on economic growth. The findings are efficient and 
reliable, as our model passed all the most important diagnostic tests. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Economies, from time to time, go through periods of high growth, slow growth, no growth and 
recessions. The recurrence of such cycles is a characteristic feature of every functioning economy. 
The recent 2008 economic recession, which was associated with a significant decline in output and a 
rise in the unemployment rate of many economies, attests to the adverse effects which can arise 
when economic cycles are severe and prolonged. The need to avoid the persistence of such 
economic cycles and restoring economic growth and employment to full potential levels is the 
mantle of macroeconomic management. Such an undertaking is cardinal for purposes of improving 
long-term growth potential, or what Haghighi, Sameti & Isfahani (2012:40) describe as the supply 
side performance of the economy. This paper aims to investigate the effectiveness of discretionary 
fiscal policy as a tool for macroeconomic management in South Africa. The main interest is to find 
out if the use of fiscal deficits in South Africa is an effective stimulative measure when the economy 
is ailing.   
The most recent scenario when the South African economy ailed is 2009, as a consequence of the 
20081 global economic recession. Prior to that, another recession, albeit, not as severe as the 2008 
one, hit this economy in 1992.  Recessions differ in many ways such as, magnitude and causes. In the 
same way they differ in terms of their characteristics, the strategies used to respond to recessions 
also differ, as Romer (1991:1) points out how, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, monetary 
policy was favoured for economic recovery, while fiscal policy was relegated to a minor role. 
However, after World War II, policy focus by many economies favoured Keynesian fiscal activism as a 
way of economic management. The popularity of this policy strategy did not however, last forever. 
The stagflation2 experiences that affected most economies in the 1970s exposed some pitfalls 
associated with the use of fiscal policy for macroeconomic management. Following that, the 
prominence of Keynesian fiscal activism dwindled.    
The decline in the influence of fiscal activism around this time gave rise to the use of the market 
approach for macroeconomic management, as propagated by monetary economists. The shift in 
policy preference was instigated by those who argued that government fiscal discretionary approach 
                                                          
1
 The 2008 economic recession had its origin in the collapse of financial markets. The suffering of these markets is only 
comparable to the Great Depression of the 1930s (Hasset & Newmark, 2008:77). 
2
 It refers to the concurrence of high inflation and high unemployment. 
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was misguided and, therefore, needed to be replaced by the invisible hand. Blinder (2001:107) 
points out that the heydays of monetary policy characterized a situation where nearly all economic 
stabilisation discussions were exclusively about monetary policy. Eichenbaum (1997:236) also argues 
that during this period countercyclical fiscal policy was neither desirable nor politically feasible.   
In a recent turn of events, it is apparent that countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy was never 
abandoned for good. After a long period of it being side-lined in policy implementation because of 
the dominance of monetarism, many economies re-embraced it during the recent 2008 economic 
recession. It can be argued that fiscal activism is now politically feasible. Some commentators 
however, are still pessimistic about the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating economic growth. 
They argue that fiscal stimuli tend to be ill-timed, poorly targeted and often of the wrong size. 
Hasset (2009:79), nonetheless, reassures  that because of lessons learnt from past experiences many 
countries, following the 2008 recession, proposed properly designed and very high stimulus 
packages, never witnessed before, in  order to jumpstart their ailing economies. In the US, for 
instance, Hasset (2009:77) points out that President Barrack Obama signed into law a stimulus 
package amounting to US$787 billion. Once again, there is a shift in policy preference, and the global 
economy has predominantly found itself again in the era of Keynesian fiscal economics.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES  
Attainment of economic growth and stabilising it is at the centre of South Africa’s and many other 
countries’ macroeconomic agenda. For South Africa, economic growth plays a crucial role as a way 
to create the much needed growth in employment levels, which in turn contributes to the long-run 
growth prospects of the economy. Ultimately, the benefits of stable growth have the ability to 
contribute to the reduction of poverty and inequality, and the improvement of the living standards 
of people. 
Stable economic growth, however, from time to time, is threated by economic events such as 
recessions, which often tend to strip it of its benefits. The most recent recession happened in the 
year 2008, and Steytler & Powel (2010:4) report that it led to South Africa’s overall GDP for 2009 
drop by 1.8 percent, with about one million jobs lost.  
One of the economic measures often employed to smoothen economic growth, particularly during 
times of recessions is referred to as a fiscal deficit, a strategy that is at the centre of Keynesian 
demand-side economics. A fiscal deficit is a situation that describes the surplus of expenditure over 
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revenue (Dalyop 2010:161). Keynesians advocate for the use of this strategy, particularly during 
depressions and recessions, when the economy suffers from insufficiency of active demand. A fiscal 
deficit, according to the Keynesians, would increase demand for productive output, resulting in the 
reduction of the unemployment rate (Dalyop 2010:154). In other words, a fiscal deficit can move the 
economy out of a recession, thereby triggering economic growth.  
This paper reports on the findings of a study on the economic stimulative effect of fiscal deficits in 
South Africa from 1991 to 2012. This can also be interpreted as finding out whether or not fiscal 
deficits are effective in stimulating the South African economy out of a recession. We do this by 
analysing the impulse response functions and the forecast error variance decomposition generated 
from a Structural Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR) model, which is discussed in more detail in chapter 
3. 
Our research question is as follows: What is the impact of fiscal deficits on South Africa’s economy 
and what factors can be expected to explain it? We identify factors that are important in influencing 
the response of economic growth to changes in fiscal deficits and further explain the mechanisms 
through which they do so.  
The null-hypothesis (H0) we test states that: Fiscal deficits lead to a positive effect on economic 
growth. The alternative hypothesis (H1), states that fiscal deficits have an effect on economic growth 
which is equal to or less than zero. 
This study, as we discuss in chapter 2, is not the first to investigate the economic effect of fiscal 
deficits, even in the case of South Africa. Different results are found by different studies depending 
on factors, such as, the time horizon considered, the country studied, the economic characteristic of 
the economy being studied, among others. It is the aim of this study to contribute to the fiscal policy 
discourse by assessing the economic effect of fiscal deficits in South Africa, while taking account of 
other factors that are most important in influencing this relationship. Our results in chapter 4 show 
that fiscal deficits have a zero impact on economic growth. Because of that, we reject the null 
hypothesis which states that fiscal deficits have a positive impact on economic growth. Conversely, 
we do not reject the alternative hypothesis which states that the effect of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth is equal to or less than zero. Based on this finding, our conclusion is that fiscal deficits are not 
effective in stimulating economic growth in South Africa.  
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1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The study is undertaken in order to analyse the response of economic growth to changes in fiscal 
deficits for the South African economy in the period 1991 to 2012. This analysis helps us to 
understand how GDP increases or decreases as a result of a fiscal stimulus, as well as how GDP can 
decline or rise as a result of contractionary fiscal policy. The logic of the effectiveness of fiscal 
deficits applies to any of the components of GDP, that is, consumption, investment and net exports 
in response to fiscal policy instruments (Gaber, 2010:6). Put differently, a fiscal shock, such as  a 
change in government spending or a change in taxation, can be examined to assess how it impacts 
GDP variables, for example, imports, private consumption and private investment. We use impulse 
response functions and the forecast error variance decomposition, generated through a five 
endogenous variable SVAR model to derive conclusions about the effectiveness of fiscal deficits on 
South Africa’s economy.  
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Generally, most economists hold the view that situations do arise when monetary policy may not be 
useful in addressing economic problems. This often is the case during recessions, as interest rates 
tend to be trapped in the lower limit bound and cannot be used for economic stimulation purposes 
(Hasset & Hubbard, 2002: 1298). The alternative option is often the use of fiscal policy, which can be 
in the form of discretionary policy or the use of automatic stabilisers. 
Discretionary fiscal policy, according to Dolls, Fuest & Peichl (2012:2) implies the deliberate actions 
by government through changes in government spending and/or taxes with the objective of 
stabilising economic cycles or reducing unemployment. The economic stimulative effect of this fiscal 
policy approach is what this paper investigates. On the other hand, automatic stabilisers can also be 
used as a fiscal policy strategy to achieve the objective of smoothening economic cycles. These 
however, do not involve explicit government intervention. By definition, automatic stabilisers, 
according to the European Central Bank (2002:33), refer to the reaction of the government budget 
to economic fluctuations in the absence of any government action”. Automatic stabilisers are 
applied in the South African economy, albeit, to a minor degree (Swanepoel & Schoeman, 2003:817).   
This study makes a contribution to the fiscal policy literature. As Fatas & Mihov (2009a:57) observe, 
the effect of fiscal policy on the economy is less studied compared to monetary policy. Perotti 
(2002:5) supports this observation, adding that the absences of high frequency data over sufficiently 
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long time periods as well as the presence of varied opinions about fiscal policy among economists 
contribute to the low number of studies on this subject. This study also adds to the few studies on 
fiscal policy in developing countries, and in particular South Africa. Most of the fiscal policy studies 
available are, according to Perotti (2002:7) and De Castro & Garrote (2012:9), based on the U.S. 
economy, even though an increasing number of them are also evident in the European Union.  
Moreover, this study helps to ascertain the effectiveness of fiscal deficits in stimulating economic 
growth in South Africa, against the backdrop of the country’s suggestion to employ a numeric target 
fiscal rule proposed in the 2011 Budget Review (Budget Review, 2011). It is worth noting that a fiscal 
rule implies that discretionary fiscal policy is ineffective in stimulating demand and that only 
automatic stabilisers should be relied upon to smooth out business cycles. The results from this 
study, hopefully, will contribute to the debate whether to abandon discretionary fiscal policy and 
pursue a fiscal rule or continue with it.   
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER 
The paper has five chapters, with the introduction as chapter one. In chapter 2, we review 
theoretical and empirical literature about fiscal deficits.  Next, in chapter 3, we discuss the 
methodology employed to ascertain the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. The discussion 
revolves around our usage of the SVAR model, whose first application to the study of fiscal policy is 
credited to Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  Chapter 4 estimates and analyses the results generated 
from the SVAR model. Finally, chapter 5 provides a conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is more agreement among academicians and policy makers on how central banks can use 
monetary policy to respond to business cycles than is the case when it comes to the use of fiscal 
policy (Fatas & Mihov, 2009a:58). The impact of fiscal deficits on the economy is a subject that is 
highly contested in economics. On the one hand, there are those who argue that fiscal deficits have 
a positive impact on economic growth. To them, fiscal deficits are effective in stimulating economic 
growth. On the other hand, there are those who argue that the effect of fiscal deficits on the 
economy is often zero or negative. They are of the view that fiscal deficits are not effective in 
stimulating economic growth. 
This chapter reviews the extensive debate around the issue of differing views on the effectiveness of 
fiscal deficits. It is organised as follows: A theoretical framework that gives perspectives of the new 
Keynesians, neoclassical and the Ricardian-equivalence theorists on fiscal deficits is given in section 
2.2. A theoretical debate about the effectiveness of fiscal deficits in stimulating economic growth, 
mainly focusing on the new Keynesians and neoclassical economists, then follows in section 2.3. 
Included in this section is a theoretical debate of how the control variables in our model may 
influence the effectiveness of fiscal deficits on economic growth.  Section 2.4 attempts to put to rest 
the theoretically contrasting views by discussing the empirical evidence on the economic effect of 
fiscal deficits. Because this paper uses a developing country as a case study, section 2.5 attempts to 
give empirical evidence of the economic effect of fiscal deficits in developing countries. The 
conclusion of the chapter is then drawn in section 2.6. 
 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There are various theories for the analysis of the effect of fiscal deficits on the economy. Basically, 
each theory leads to unique conclusions about how fiscal deficits affect economic growth. This 
section focuses on three contentious ones, the new Keynesian, neoclassical and the Ricardian-
equivalence approaches. 
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2.2.1 Keynesianism   
The well-known book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, written by John 
Maynard Keynes, later Lord Keynes, in (1936) was the first to offer a theoretical framework for fiscal 
policy. This theory, also known as Keynesianism, emerged amidst a drastic rise in global 
unemployment levels, caused by the Great Depression of 1929. The unemployment rate at the time 
was above 20% and the output gap widened in economies around Europe and the U.S (Barro, 
1997:5). When the economies were in this state, Keynes declared that governments should 
increase spending and cut taxes to boost their economies. Most fundamentally, Keynes saw 
GDP as being determined in the short-run by aggregate demand. Recession or depression 
was due to demand falling short of the existing productive capacity of the economy, and the 
remedy was to stimulate demand. 
  
At this time, this was considered unorthodox since the prevailing view was that a market 
economy would recover on its own, automatically, without government action. Keynes, in 
contrast, argued that an economy could languish indefinitely with high unemployment, 
despite the presence of abundant productive capacity in the economy, if aggregate demand 
is inadequate. The Keynesian perspective is that when aggregate demand is insufficient, 
firms perform poorly and their profits decline through-out the economy. Declining profits 
induce firms to cut back production and to lay off workers. Rising unemployment and 
declining profits further depress demand, resulting in an endless cycle of absent aggregate 
demand (Fazzari, Ferri & Greenberg, 1998:527). Keynes further contended that monetary 
policy is powerless to boost the economy out of a depression because it depends on 
reducing interest rates, and in a depression interest rates are already close to zero, what is 
also referred to as the liquidity trap (Hasset & Hubbard, 2002:1298). 
  
The way out of such an economic problem, according to Keynes, is to run a fiscal deficit. By 
increasing government spending, Keynesians argue that it would not only boost demand 
directly but would also set off a chain reaction of increased demand from workers and 
suppliers whose incomes had been increased by the government's expenditure (Saleh, 
2003:6). Similarly, according to Saleh (2003:6), Keynesians believe that a tax cut would put 
more disposable income in the pockets of consumers, and that too would boost demand.  
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The basic Keynesian macroeconomic model reveals interesting economic results that can 
emerge from the application of the above strategies (fiscal deficits). One of the key results 
of this model is that changes in government spending or taxation are multiplied in their 
effect on the economy. Through the increase in government spending and reduction in taxes, 
national income initially will increase by the actual value of the deficit, and then generate second 
round effects through the Keynesian multiplier.  
 
The idea of the Keynesian multiplier is that, an increase in government expenditure by R1 directly 
increases income by R1, then the multiplier effect results in national income increasing by more than 
R1. In other words, the increase in the fiscal deficit need not be an amount equivalent to the 
prevailing output gap, but rather, should be an amount which, through a secondary multiplier effect, 
is just enough to close the output gap. It also follows that the stimulation of national income and 
consumption which occurs should entail that investment also increases – ‘investment accelerator’ as 
some call it (Gaber, 2010:5). Eventually, the fiscal deficit boosts capacity utilisation and smoothens 
out the business cycle.  
 
Keynesianism is premised on certain assumptions. They include, firstly, a possibility of excess 
production capacity and unemployed labour and, secondly, a significant proportion of the 
population is liquidity constrained (Dwivedi, 2010:362), (Grabowski & Shields 2000:2) and (Saleh, 
2003:3). The first assumption suggests that there is capacity underutilisation and hence, a negative 
output gap3 in the economy. The second assumption implies that individuals are thought to increase, 
immediately and significantly, their demand in response to a temporary reduction in taxes or 
increase in government spending.  
When the economy is in a situation as assumed above, it is clearly operating below potential. For 
Keynesians, this is the situation that warrants the use of fiscal deficits in order to smooth out 
economic growth (Fatas & Mihov, 2009a:60). 
 
2.2.2 Neoclassical theory  
From the point of view of neoclassical theory, fiscal deficits mainly have a negative effect on 
economic growth. The seminal work by Diamond (1965), cited by Bernheim (1989:57), was the first 
case to put a neoclassical argument against budget deficits. Its conclusion was that fiscal deficits 
                                                          
3
 A negative output gap implies that the difference between potential (efficient) output and actual output is negative. 
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raise interest rates which in turn crowd-out private capital accumulation. Many other scholars have 
supported this neoclassical argument. These include Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987) and Taylor (2009), 
among others.  
 
The neoclassical argument represents the crowding-out effect that is postulated by the standard IS-
LM analysis. This analysis contends that the expansion in output arising from a fiscal deficit will raise 
money demand. If the supply of money is fixed, interest rates will increase, and private investment 
(capital accumulation) will fall. In turn, this reduces output and tends to offset the Keynesian 
multiplier effect.  
 
As with Keynesian theory, neoclassical theory is also guided by certain assumptions. It assumes that 
consumers are farsighted, rational, and can access perfect capital markets. With these assumptions, 
consumers are unlikely to increase their consumption as a result of increased government spending 
or reduction in taxes. For this reason, deficits cannot stimulate economic activity. Bernheim 
(1989:59) argues that by acknowledging these assumptions fiscal deficits display inimical effects on 
interest rates, private investment and consumption.  
 
The remedy to smoothening out business cycles, according to neoclassical theory lies in allowing the 
invisible hand of the market to work freely, as opposed to allowing government intervention 
through fiscal deficits. Taylor (2009:550) and Bernheim (1989:57) point out that self-adjustment in 
prices and wages will enable the economy to restore optimal equilibrium. The theory argues that in 
the event that the economy deviates from equilibrium and creates a negative output gap, wages in 
the economy would quickly be forced to fall, thereby reducing the cost of production for suppliers. 
The reduction in the cost of production would lead to increased output, which would then close the 
output gap, without the involvement of government.  
2.2.3 Ricardian-equivalence theory 
The Ricardian-equivalence theory posits that regardless of how it is financed, a fiscal deficit would 
have no impact on private consumption or income (Dalyop 2010:162). In other words, a fiscal deficit 
does not spur consumption growth, and thus, does not have an expansionary effect on output. This 
is because when a deficit is implemented, individuals increase their current savings in expectation of 
increased tax burdens in the future (Corden, 1991:7). The conclusion of the Ricardian-equivalence is 
that a fiscal deficit will not generate a positive effect on economic growth.  
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This school of thought is only applicable under extreme assumptions. The assumptions include the 
following:  
1) The government budget constraint  is internalised by consumers who are indifferent to the 
sources of government finance; 
2) Capital markets are perfect, that is, the interest rate for borrowers and lenders should be 
the same; 
3) There are no distortions in taxes. 
Basically, under this theory, it is believed that there are generational inter-linkages bound by 
generosity, so much so that the current generation is concerned about the plight and welfare of 
future generations (Bernheim, 1989:56).  On account of having unrealistic assumptions, many 
economists dismiss the Ricardian-equivalence approach. See Buiter (2010), Blinder (2004), Arestis & 
Sawyer (2003) and Hemming, Kell & Mahfouz (2002). For instance, in an empirical study, Blinder 
(2004:21) finds that consumption strongly responds to current cash income compared to future tax 
changes. He argues that this revelation invalidates the Ricardian-equivalence argument that 
consumers are not liquidity constrained (Blinder, 2004:21). Because many economists dismiss this 
theory, we focus mainly on the theoretical debates between the new Keynesian and the neoclassical 
theorists.  
  
2.3 RELATED THEORETICAL DEBATES  
2.3.1 Ideological arguments of fiscal deficits   
It is perhaps essential to start the debate about fiscal deficits between Keynesians and neoclassical 
economists by indicating that this debate is closely aligned with ideological arguments around the 
role of the state in the economy (Fatas & Mihov, 2009a:59). John Maynard Keynes made a key 
contribution in this regard by arguing that leaving an economy to run itself can cause it to collapse 
and remain in a lethargic state. It is for this reason that Keynesians contend that the neoclassical 
suggestion that the economy should correct itself through wage and price adjustments is unlikely to 
work, but rather that government’s help is needed. Fatas & Mihov (2009a:60) argue that Keynesians 
claim that wages and prices tend to be sticky when they should be falling, and, if the economy is left 
to correct itself after collapsing, it would be a recipe for prolonging and deepening the downfall.  
Neoclassical economists, on the other hand, insist that state intervention results in the misallocation 
of resources in the economy and always fails. State intervention presupposes that government 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
policy makers are knowledgeable about how to run the economy. This assumption is based on shaky 
grounds because government may undertake actions so that they can be seen by electorates to be 
working and satisfying vested interest groups in the process. Fatas & Mihov (2009a:59) mention that 
state intervention is criticised on the basis that, often, expenditure programmes are crafted to 
satisfy narrow political priorities, rather than broader macroeconomic needs. Because of that, they 
suggest that the economy is better off correcting itself.  
By extension, neoclassical economists criticise fiscal deficits with the argument that they expand 
public programmes such that they stress tax payers and limit the free operation of the market (Fatas 
& Mihov, 2009a:60). They further argue that fiscal deficits, which are financed through domestic 
debt, only entail a transfer of resources from the private to the public sector. According to them, 
none of this is desirable, since, it is the private sector that can create more jobs and promote 
economic growth (Dalyop, 2010:162). The notion that the free market system moves faster and 
better than the rigid hand of government is crucial in the neoclassical line of thinking. 
Those opposed to the neoclassical economics standpoint argue that increased stimulus packages are 
necessary to restore a balanced form of capitalism by increasing public expenditure, and investing in 
areas important for economic growth and social welfare (Kuttner, 2009:1). 
2.3.2 The crowding-out argument  
It was highlighted in section 2.2 that Keynesians propagate the notion that fiscal deficits translate 
into growth of national income with a positive multiplier effect. The merit of this multiplier effect is 
that it helps to re-establish output to its full potential. However, criticism against this claim has been 
crafted by neoclassical economists. They contend that the Keynesian claim ignores the secondary 
effects of fiscal policy. When government undertakes a fiscal deficit, its source of finance is the 
credit market, through borrowing. If the money supply is fixed, borrowing by government reduces 
funds (savings) available in the financial markets and that may raise interest rates. Interest rates that 
are high may lead to crowding-out of private investment and consumer spending (Arestis & Sawyer, 
2003:9). Thus, the efficacy of a fiscal deficit in stimulating growth is offset to a certain extent by the 
effect of crowding-out. 
The above argument clearly raises the important issue of the interplay between fiscal and monetary 
policies. It would obviously be wrong to analyse the effects of fiscal policy on the economy in 
isolation from the interrelationship it has with monetary policy. Davig & Leeper (2011:212) point out 
that most researchers find that “separating monetary and fiscal policies overlooks policy interactions 
that are important for determining equilibrium”. (See also Ilzetzki, Mendoza & Vegh, 2010:3). We 
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acknowledge this caution and have included the short-term real interest rate variable in the model 
to analyse how monetary policy interacts with fiscal policy.  
The inclusion of this variable helps us to achieve the following objectives: firstly, study the crowding-
out effect argument propagated by the neoclassical economists. Secondly, find out the influence of 
the real short-term interest rate on the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli in South Africa considering that 
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) follows an inflation-targeting4 monetary policy framework 
through a Taylor-type interest rate rule. This means that the SARB adjusts the short-term interest 
rate in response to deviations of GDP and inflation from their steady-state levels (Jooste, Liu 
Naraidoo, 2012:7). In this case, the active role of monetary policy to maintain a certain desired level 
of inflation or output through changes in the interest rate might offset the stimulative effect of fiscal 
policy (Perotti, 2002:5). For this reason, Spilimbergo et al (2009:3) and Christiano, Eichenbaum & 
Rebelo (2009:79) have concluded that fiscal policy is a failure under inflation-targeting monetary 
policy. We are interested in ascertaining the extent to which this conclusion is correct in the South 
African context.  
It is necessary to caution however, that Keynesians do not dispel the possibility that fiscal deficits 
may lead to a rise in interest rates and thus, crowding out private investment. They argue that the 
interest rates may rise when the economy is operating above potential output because in that state 
monetary authorities would want to prevent the over-heating of the economy (Fatas & Mihov 
2009a: 59). Fiscal policy is effective during recessions (when output is below potential) which 
coincide with the time when interest rates are trapped in the lower limit bound and are likely to be 
unresponsive to the pressure imposed by increased fiscal deficits. During this time, the dampening 
effect of increasing interest rates on private spending is minimised. Christiano et al (2009:79) argue 
that for this reason, Keynesians recommend the implementation of fiscal deficits during times of 
recessions. 
2.3.3 Fiscal deficits and exchange rate regimes  
The discussion on the interaction of monetary policy and fiscal policy also spills over to the type of 
exchange rate regime pursued by the monetary authorities. A number of scholars have argued that 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating economic growth depends on the exchange rate 
regime employed and the mobility of capital in the economy. See among others, Spilimbergo et al 
(2009:3) and Ilzetzki et al (2010:7). Most of these scholars argue for the potency of fiscal policy in 
fixed exchange rate regimes, as capital mobility increases. According to Boussard, De Castro & Salto 
                                                          
4
 South Africa has been following inflation-targeting since February 2000 (Van der Merwe, 2004:1).  
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(2012:4), “fixed exchange rate regimes magnify the fiscal multiplier in the presence of capital 
mobility because of the monetary accommodation necessary to keep the exchange rate at parity”. 
See also Jooste et al (2012:15).  
South Africa has passed through a number of exchange rate regimes. Table 2.1 below shows the 
types of exchange rate regimes that South Africa has been through since 1985. It shows that 
different exchange rate regimes have been used since then. Although they come in different mixes, 
Van der Merwe (2004:2) argues that exchange rate regimes usually fall within the two extreme 
regimes, namely fixed and floating exchange rates. From Table 2.1, we follow Ilzetzki et al (2010:11) 
by classifying periods of dual exchange rate regime (Managed float commercial Rand and free float 
financial Rand) under fixed exchange rate regime. Everything else is then considered to fall under 
flexible exchange rate regime. From table 2.1, the only period considered to have had a flexible 
exchange rate regime is from the first quarter of 1995 onwards. Gupta (2012:2) states that South 
Africa changed to a flexible exchange rate regime in 1995.  We are interested in assessing how this 
variable influences the potency of fiscal policy in South Africa by entering it as a dummy variable in 
our SVAR model. 
 
Table 2.1 Episodes of exchange rate regimes in South Africa  
Episode Date Exchange rate regime 
I 1985Q3-1995Q1 Dual exchange rate regime: 
Managed float commercial and 
free float financial rand 
Ii 1995Q1-2000Q1 Unitary exchange rate: 
Managed float rand 
Iii 2000Q1-Present Unitary exchange rate: Free 
floating rand with inflation- 
targeting monetary policy 
framework. 
Source: De kock Commission (1985)  
 
2.3.4 Fiscal deficits and the real exchange rate 
The real exchange rate is another important monetary policy variable which cannot be overlooked 
when investigating the impact of fiscal policy on the economy. This is because this variable helps us 
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to examine the country’s external competitive position after a fiscal shock has occurred. 
Theoretically, according to De Castro & Garrote (2012:9), fiscal deficits lead to the real appreciation 
of the exchange rate. Studies by Froot & Rogoff (1991:280) and De Gregorio, Giovannini, & Wolf 
(1994:1230), in line with theoretical predictions, find that increased government consumption leads 
to the long-run appreciation of the real effective exchange rate. Beetsma, Giuliodori & Klaassen 
(2008:415), recognise that government spending shocks do not only lead to the real appreciation of 
the exchange rate but also heighten the budget deficits and lead to negative trade balances. Saleh 
(2003:1) adds to this argument by highlighting the Mundell-Fleming framework, which posits that an 
increase in the budget deficit would induce upward pressure on interest rates, causing capital 
inflows and an appreciation of the exchange rate, thereby leading to an increase in the current 
account deficit. This culminates in the “twin-deficits hypothesis” where fiscal shocks lead to 
increased fiscal deficits, as well as a trade deficit. See De Castro & Garrote (2012:9) and Saleh 
(2003:1). 
2.3.5 Fiscal deficits and economic openness     
The other contentious debate around the effectiveness of fiscal deficits is on how it is influenced by 
the degree of economic openness to trade. Leeper, Traum & Walker (2011:15) point out that “in 
open economies, increases in government spending result in a substitution away from domestically 
produced products towards imported products.” See also Boussard, et al (2012:4) and Spilimbergo 
et al (2009:3). Dalyop (2010:161) points out that, in open economies, increased government 
expenditure does not only lead to increased demand for foreign goods, but foreign assets, as well. 
This arises because of the excess money supply that results from the debt instruments drawn on the 
central bank (Dalyop, 2010:161). It also leads to domestic absorption5 and thus, import expansion 
resulting in a current account deficit (Corsetti & Mueller, 2012:61). For this reason, Spilimbergo et al 
(2009:3) argue that more open economies have a higher propensity for imports and in such 
economies fiscal deficits are less effective compared to closed or partially open economies. In 
chapter 4, we investigate the impact of South Africa’s degree of openness to trade on the 
effectiveness of fiscal deficits.   
Keynesians are, however, aware of the negative impact that fiscal deficits could have on the external 
sector, and thus, on economic growth. In fact, the arguments presented above are according to 
Saleh (2003:13), in line with the conventional Keynesian economics view which contends that the 
effectiveness of fiscal deficits may be adversely affected the more open an economy is. They 
                                                          
5
 Government spending is usually biased towards domestic goods and services. This makes domestic products scarcer, 
thereby pushing up the relative price compared to imported products. As a result, a real appreciation of the domestic 
currency ensures leading the economy into a trade deficit (Frenkel & Razin, 1996:130). 
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contend that the above arguments are possible if the additional liquidity largely leads to an increase 
in the level of imports compared to domestic output (Dalyop, 2010:161). For this reason, they 
suggest that the domestic economy should be able to absorb the additional liquidity through the 
expansion of output, as this would make fiscal deficits more stimulative (Dalyop, 2010:161).  
2.3.6 Fiscal deficits and savings  
Another concern that neoclassical economists have with fiscal deficits is that they reduce savings in 
the economy. They contend that this reduction could have long-term economic repercussions. Their 
contention is that total savings in a country comprise individual, corporation and government 
savings. With low savings, as a result of fiscal deficits, a country will either reduce its investment in 
new plant and equipment or increase borrowing from abroad. Both measures lead to unpleasant 
consequences in the long-run. Lower levels of investment will result in lower capital stock and a 
reduction in a country’s ability to produce output in the future. Increased foreign debt entails that 
the domestic economy is obliged to transfer a large portion of its economic gains to foreign 
economies at the expense of the domestic economy (Chowdhury, 2004:488). 
Keynesians, on the other hand, shield themselves from the above criticism by arguing that fiscal 
deficits would not necessarily lead to the draining of savings from the economy. Eisner (1989:89) 
argues that the rise in aggregate demand that comes with fiscal deficits would improve profits on 
private investments, thus, leading to increased investment levels, given any rate of interest.  
Therefore, fiscal deficits may actually increase savings and investment, in spite of the fact that they 
may increase interest rates. 
2.3.7 Supply-side vs. Demand-side economic measures  
Anti-Keynesians have also criticised fiscal deficits on the basis that they go against the principle of 
supply-side economics. This view is supported by Brunner (1982:844-845) who asserts that the key 
factor in driving economic growth is not consumer spending but production. To the supply-side 
economists, it is backward to focus on consumer spending because consumption is an offshoot of 
production. They argue that pursuing prosperity through consumer spending might bring an 
appearance of prosperity, when in actual fact the opposite is the case. Ultimately, economic growth 
is a function of the supply of factors of production6 and not demand. To Bernheim (1989:71), 
focusing on raising aggregate demand using deficits only fuels inflation and not growth.  
                                                          
6
 This refers to factors of production such as labour, capital and technology. 
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Keynesians defend themselves against the above criticism by arguing that a recession is a 
consequence of inadequate aggregate demand, as pointed out in section 2.2.1.  In order to counter 
this situation, aggregate demand must be stimulated through the increase in spending and cutting 
down of tax, which essentially entails applying a fiscal deficit. This boosts consumer spending, 
business investment and output (Fatas & Mihov 2009a:67). Feldstein (2009:557) also points out that 
the lifting power of government spending is required to stimulate consumer demand and business 
spending.  In the absence of such a measure, Keynesians believe an economic recession would be 
longer and more severe.   
2.3.8 Fiscal deficits on consumer and business confidence 
The other contested issue between the two schools of thought is the extent to which deficits can 
boost consumer confidence. Keynesians argue that stimulus spending boosts consumer confidence 
by showing, at least, a notion that the economy will run normally. Dalyop (2010:162) points out that 
a fiscal deficit stimulates the economy in the short-run by making households feel wealthier, 
resulting in increased private and public consumption spending. Aggregate demand increases lead to 
improved economic activity. This leads to the stimulation of savings and capital formation. 
Consequently, consumers and businesses are motivated to increase their purchases more than they 
otherwise would. This, as a result, has a positive impact on the economy.  
The above argument is refuted by neoclassical economists. Balcerowicz & Rzonca (2008:1) argue 
that proposed stimulus bills prompt consumers and businesses to hold negative views about the 
economy, which might undermine their confidence. As a result, consumers choose to save the 
money spent by government, instead of spending it. This results in economic aggregate demand, 
capital formation and economic activity not increasing, as suggested by the Keynesians. 
2.3.9 Fiscal deficits and public debt 
Finally, the disagreement between these two schools of thought revolves around the topic of debt. 
Neoclassical economists argue that fiscal deficits damage the economy through increased future 
debt obligations (Seidman & Lewis, 2009:204). The commitment by government to service the debt 
in future puts a heavy tax weight on future tax payers. 
However, Keynesians justify increasing debt during a recession on account that it will lead to 
boosting growth, thereby, generating an increase in revenue, which can be used to repay the 
acquired debt. Feldstein (2009:558) acknowledges that at the end of a recession, each economy’s 
debt to GDP ratio rises. Following the increase in the debt to GDP ratio, Feldstein (2009:558) argues 
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that policies can be developed, such as gradually cutting down government expenditure so as to 
move to a fiscal surplus position and limit the debt burden. 
 
2.4 RELATED LITERATURE ON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Taking the theoretical debate presented above into consideration, the correct position about the 
effectiveness of fiscal deficits, however, can only be confirmed through empirical evidence. It is the 
objective of this section to discuss the empirical evidence pertaining to the effectiveness of fiscal 
deficits generated by different types of fiscal shocks. It focuses on the evidence for tax shocks, 
spending shocks, short-run and long-run effects of fiscal deficits, as well as evidence of the impact of 
fiscal deficits in developing countries, and South Africa in particular.  
2.4.1 Tax shocks 
To stimulate consumption and investment, and, hence, economic growth, government may 
implement tax rebates (tax cuts) as a fiscal measure. In practice, evidence about the effect of tax 
changes on economic growth (GDP) is mixed. We define the tax shock, according to Riera-Crichton, 
Vegh & Vuletin (2012:2) as the response of output to a change in taxes.  
Following the 2001 economic recession, Johnson, Souleles & Parker (2006:1591) use survey data on 
consumer expenditure in the U.S to investigate the impact of tax rebates on consumer expenditure. 
They establish that tax rebates increase consumer spending on non-durable goods. Agarwal, Liu & 
Souleles (2007:3) investigate tax cuts in the U.S, following the 2001 recession, and discover that 
individuals, first, channel the money brought by the tax cut towards reducing the debt on their credit 
card, after which, they increase their purchase of goods. This counters the proposition of the 
Ricardian-equivalence theorists, discussed in section 2.2.3, who argue that individuals do not 
respond to tax cuts by increasing their current purchases. Romer & Romer (2007:20) find that a 1 per 
cent tax cut results in about 3 per cent increase in GDP, in a time frame of about two years. The 
above findings indicate that, to a large degree, tax cuts have a positive effect on GDP.  
From the point of view of business investment, some of the empirical evidence suggests that tax cuts 
produce significant positive economic effects. Using the Standard Hall-Jergenson User Cost Model7, 
Hasset & Hubbard (2002:1330) find empirical evidence that tax rebates in U.S. significantly impact 
positively on investment. House & Shapiro (2008:744) investigate the response of business 
                                                          
7
This model measures changes in the incentive to invest as a result of various forms of investment tax credits. 
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investment to tax provisions in U.S. and find that investment increases mostly in equipment with 
long time duration. 
Not everyone agrees that tax cuts are effective in stimulating consumption and business spending, 
however. Shapiro & Slemrod (2009:377), following the recent 2008 recession, undertook a survey 
which reveals that only 20% of respondents in U.S planned to increase their consumption spending 
as a result of stimulus tax rebates. Taylor (2009:551) presents data showing that tax rebates 
announced for the U.S economy in 2008 increase the disposable personal income but have a 
negative impact on personal consumption expenditure. This finding is presented in Figure 2.1, shown 
below.  
Figure 2.1 Response of Consumption to the 2008 stimulus              
  
Source: Taylor (2009). 
This finding is in line with the permanent income theory in which consumers respond marginally to 
temporary income increases. In other words, the evidence produced here shows that tax-cuts have a 
negative effect on personal consumption expenditure and thus, cannot stimulate economic growth.   
On the question of business investment, Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987:49) conduct policy simulations 
based on the impact of temporary reductions in income tax on private capital accumulation. Their 
conclusion is that these tax cuts have little or perverse short-run effects on private investment. For 
instance, they find that temporary reduction in income tax rates for a period of five years would 
increase savings by roughly 20 per cent in the first year. However, in the new steady state, per capita 
capital would fall by 7.5 per cent (Auerbach & Kotlikoff, 1987:52-53). This suggests that tax-cuts have 
little positive impact on business investment.  
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2.4.2 Government spending shocks 
The government spending shock, according to Spilimbergo et al (2009:3) measures the change in 
output resulting from a change in government spending. Keynesian textbooks predict a positive 
effect on economic output arising from government expenditure. Findings from simulations run by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on three economies8 find the 
economic effect, arising from government spending, which is significantly positive (Fatas & Mihov, 
2009a:66). Barrell, Becker, Byrne, Gottshalk, Hurst & Welsum (2004:899) find a strong positive 
impact of government spending in the German economy. Benazic (2006:883) finds that increasing 
government expenditure in Croatia leads to an increase in GDP.  
Anti-Keynesians reject the above claims. Barro (1981:1109) differentiates the impact of increases in 
military and non-military government expenditure on aggregate output in the U.S.  He establishes 
that increasing military spending leads to a small positive change in economic growth. On the 
question of non-military spending by government, he finds that it has a negative impact on output. 
Barro (1981:1109) argues that when government expenditure is too high, it crowds-out investment 
and negatively affects exports.  
In direct response to the above critic, Fatas & Mihov (2009a:63) argue that Barro’s (1981:1109) 
findings are based on military spending shocks in the aftermath of the Great Depression (1943-44), 
the period in which output was already above potential, that is, unemployment rate was very low. In 
this case, government spending is likely to generate a close to zero effect on economic growth. 
When Fatas & Mihov (2009a:63) use Barro’s (1981:1109) neoclassical methodology to estimate the 
effect of spending for the year 1941, when output was below potential, they find a positive effect, 
and when they try it for the year 1940, the positive effect is even larger. This to them is confirmation 
that fiscal policy is effective in stimulating economic growth. 
Furthermore, Ramey & Shapiro (1999:176) dispel the Keynesian view in their investigation of fiscal 
deficits in the U.S. arising from an increase in government spending during wars. Their finding is in 
line with the neoclassical prediction that defence spending shocks have no positive effect on wages 
and consumption. However, their finding can be questioned on the basis that it does not mention 
what the impact would be on economic growth due to government spending in time of peace.  
                                                          
8
   An interlink model was used which coordinated three economies- U.S., the Euro area and Japan - to determine the 
multiplier effects.   
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2.4.3 Short-term and long-run effects of fiscal deficits 
Many studies have explored the short-run and/or the long-run effects of expansionary fiscal policy. 
The findings differ. Blanchard & Perotti (2002), Mountford & Uhlig (2002) and Perotti (2005) find 
that short-run shocks to government expenditure in the U.S. lift consumption, real wage and GDP, in 
line with Keynesianism. On the other hand, Hemming, Kell & Mahfouz (2002:23) find that the short-
run effect of government expenditure on output is quite close to zero.  
In terms of the long-run impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth, most of the literature finds a 
negative result. See Grier & Tullock (1989); Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti & Schiantarelli (1999), 
Grossman (1990) and Fatas & Mihov (2001b). The only study we were able to come across with a 
positive long-run fiscal policy effect is by Li (2010:20) on the Chinese economy. 
Other studies give mixed findings regarding the short-run and long-run effects of fiscal deficits. 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum & Fisher (1999:176) establish that in the short-run, government expenditure 
has a positive impact. However, beyond a year, this impact continuously falls. Barro & Redlick 
(2009:43), using a neoclassical model, argue that the short-run effect of higher government 
expenditure can be positive, but the long-run impact is likely to be very close to zero. Ilzetzki et al 
(2010:15) study government consumption spending and find a negative impact in the short term, 
while for the medium and long-run, they differ considerably depending on the economic 
characteristics9. 
2.4.4 Effectiveness of deficit induced fiscal policies in Developed Countries 
As stated in section 1.4, studies on the effectiveness of fiscal deficits in developed countries have 
been more extensive, as compared to developing economies. Just as in the other cases we discussed 
above, the economic impact of fiscal deficits in developed countries is varied.  Johnson et al 
(2006:1591), Agarwal et al (2007:3) and Romer & Romer (2007:20) find a positive response of 
consumption spending arising from tax cut shocks in U.S. Furthermore, Hasset & Hubbard 
(2002:1330) and House & Shapiro (2008:744) find that tax cuts have a positive effect on U.S. 
investment. 
On the contrary, Shapiro & Slemrod (2009:377) and Taylor (2009:551) establish that tax cuts have a 
negative effect on consumption spending, while Aurbach & Kotlikoff (1987:49) conclude that tax cuts 
have a negative impact on private investment. 
                                                          
9
 Spilimbergo et al (2009:3), Fatas & Mihov (2009a:63) argue that different economic characteristics such as whether a 
country is pursuing inflation targeting monetary policy, is in the expansionary phase, is closed to foreign trade, and so 
forth, will have an effect on the potency of fiscal deficits. 
 
 
 
 
 21 
 
From the point of view of government spending shocks, a study done on the U.S., the Euro area and 
Japan, reports positive effects of spending on GDP. Barrel et al (2004:899) find a positive response of 
GDP to government spending in German.  On the other hand, Barro (1981:1109) and Ramey & 
Shapiro (1999:176) conclude that government spending has a negative effect on GDP. 
The above analysis establishes a view that fiscal policy may be effective in stimulating economic 
growth in some cases and may prove impotent in others. Following the argument by Spilimbergo et 
al (2009:3), this is due to the fact that the effectiveness of fiscal deficits differs depending on various 
economic characteristics, which among some include, the monetary policy regime being pursued, 
degree of economic openness and the size of the fiscal deficit.  This could explain why, in our 
analysis of developed countries, fiscal policy has both positive and negative economic effects. The 
same kind of reasoning, to some extent, applies to developing countries as we illustrate in the next 
section.  
2.5 FISCAL POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
This section is included to highlight the point that economic policies affect countries of different 
economic strength differently. So often, when economic policies are suggested at a global level, it is 
assumed that their impact will be the same across all economies. This section takes note of the fact 
that there are differences in social, institutional and economic characteristics between developed 
and developing economies.  With South Africa being a developing country, the conclusions made 
about fiscal policy in developed countries might not apply here.  This section therefore, provides 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal deficits in stimulating economic growth in 
developing countries.  
2.4.5 2.5.1 Effectiveness of deficit induced fiscal policies in developing Countries 
Generally, developing countries have been dependent on fiscal deficits to accelerate growth 
(Chowdhury, 2004:3). This is because most of them are incapable of mobilising enough resources to 
trigger growth. Additionally, developing countries face uncertainty with respect to foreign 
investment and capital flows (Chowdhury, 2004:3). Fiscal deficits, therefore, become an important 
economic strategy for engineering economic growth. 
Empirical evidence about the effectiveness of fiscal deficits on developing economies is mixed. The 
study by Ilzetzki et al (2010) uses a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model to compare the impact of 
fiscal deficits between twenty developed and twenty five developing/emerging nations. Their finding 
is that, in developing/emerging nations, the response of output to increases in government 
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consumption spending is smaller on impact and considerably less persistent than in high income 
countries (Ilzetzki et al. 2010:2). Dalyop (2010:168) concludes that fiscal deficits have an insignificant 
impact on the Nigerian economy. 
 
Other studies strongly support the implementation of fiscal deficits in developing countries. 
Chowdhury (2004:4) studies the output impact of fiscal deficits on five developing countries from 
South Asia10 and concludes that developing economies need more fiscal deficits than less, because 
deficits neither crowd-out investment nor have a perceptible impact on exchange-rates. Vera 
(2009:612) dismisses the simplistic conclusions of neoclassical economics which disregards the 
institutional differences between developed and developing economies, and shows evidence which 
supports the fact that deficits crowd-in public and private investment. Adam & Bevan (2006:53) find 
that for developing economies, which are not in their steady state, there is a range over which 
deficit financing may be growth-enhancing. Anh, Nhat & Thang (2010:770) study the fiscal stimulus 
exercised by the Vietnam government, amounting to 8.3% of GDP. They find that growth increases 
from 3.1% in the first quarter of 2009 to 7.7% in the fourth quarter of the same year, and from 4.4% 
in the second quarter of 2009 to 5.2% in the third quarter of the same year (Anh et al. 2010:770). 
 
The foregoing findings provide great theoretical insight in terms of Keynesian modelling between 
developed and developing economies. Some of the features of orthodox Keynesian economics seem 
not to apply in the context of developing economies. As evidenced above, contrary to views of some 
ardent Keynesians like Eisner (1989:74) who admit that fiscal deficits do tend to crowd-out 
investment, to a large extent, the impact of fiscal deficits on investment and economic growth in 
developing countries is positive. Ilzetzki et al (2010:2) add to this argument, as they find that 
government investment spending has a positive and great fiscal effect in developing countries and 
an insignificant one in developed countries. This, thus, invites for a Keynesian theoretical framework 
which is centred on developing economies’ institutional and economic characteristics, as opposed to 
the orthodox Keynesian framework. As shown above, such a framework enables us to establish that, 
in the presence of productive capacity, given structural deficiency in aggregate demand, a fiscal 
deficit can have positive effects, especially if it results in infrastructure spending or any other forms 
of investment spending. Following this, this study investigates the effectiveness of fiscal deficits in 
South Africa from a developing country Keynesian perspective. 
 
 
                                                          
10
 The countries are: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. 
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2.5.2 Fiscal Policy in South Africa 
Post-apartheid South Africa is renowned for having experienced the most remarkable level of 
economic stability, recording the longest business cycle in the country’s history (Du Plessis, Smit & 
Sturzenegger 2008:3). Aron & Muellbauer (2005:134-138) have pointed to the fact that this period 
was associated with lower and stable inflation, lower and stable real interest rates, steady GDP 
growth, and stable fiscal deficits and debt. Du Plessis et al (2008:3) allude to the fact that the 
remarkable economic improvements can also be attributed to the smooth political transition that 
took place after South Africa conducted its first democratic elections in 1994, which culminated in 
less uncertainty for investors. 
 
This remarkable growth was, however, thwarted by the event of the 2008 recession which 
negatively affected economic growth around the globe. South Africa was not spared. According to 
Steytler & Powel (2010:4) South Africa experienced a 1.8 percent overall drop in GDP in 2009 due to 
this recession, with about one million people losing jobs. With monetary policy ineffective due to the 
liquidity trap, as discussed in section 2.2.1, Keynesian discretionary fiscal policy was one of the main 
options available to uplift the ailing economy. According to the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) (2009:8), South Africa released a stimulus package amounting to US$ 7.5 billion 
to be spent over the period 2009 to 2011, in response to the recession. 
 
Prior to the discretionary policy exercised in 2008, Du Plessis et al (2008:7) point out that since 1996, 
the Minister of Finance, then Trevor Manuel, also made intentional announcements to implement 
discretionary fiscal policy in the years 1998, 2001 and 2007. However, before then, Calitz & Siebrits 
(2003:56) do mention that fiscal authorities in South Africa had not been keen on applying 
discretionary counter-cyclical fiscal policy since the late seventies. South Africa was not the only 
economy where discretionary fiscal policy was not popular after the 1970s. As mentioned in section 
1.1, many economies abandoned discretionary fiscal policy in preference for the market approach 
due to the stagflation experiences of the 1970s (Blinder, 2001:107). 
 
The empirical assessment of the performance of discretionary fiscal policy in South Africa is mixed. 
Ocran (2009:14) finds fiscal deficits to have an insignificant effect on economic growth, while 
government consumption and investment spending produce positive effects on output outcomes. 
Jooste et al (2012:1) find that increasing tax decreases GDP in the short- run, while the impact in the 
long-run is negligible. In terms of government spending in South Africa, Jooste et al (2012:1) find it 
to sometimes produce positive effects in the short-run, while the long-term impact is insignificant. 
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Our results in chapter 4 help us to make cross comparisons with the findings of Ocran (2009:14) and 
Jooste et al (2012:1).  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The chapter has shown that there is neither a theoretical nor an empirical argument which is 
conclusive about the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth, although, to a large degree, 
empirical evidence seems to suggest that fiscal deficits are effective in developing countries. This is 
because a range of factors such as assumptions used, the time horizon considered, and a country’s 
economic policy characteristics, institutional and prevailing economic conditions have a great 
influence on the economic effect of fiscal deficits.  
 
 
 
 
 25 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Having reviewed the literature in the previous chapter, the current chapter offers a detailed 
discussion of the research methodology which is used to determine how effective fiscal deficits are 
in stimulating economic growth in South Africa. A research methodology is, according to Adams & 
Schvaneveldt (1991:16), “the application of scientific procedure towards acquiring answers to a wide 
variety of research questions. It provides tools for doing research as well as for obtaining useful 
information”. 
As mentioned earlier, the determination of the effect of fiscal deficits on economic growth requires 
the assessment of the impulse response functions and the forecast error variance decomposition. 
Doing so is the basis of the research design for this study. In the empirical analysis about the effect 
of fiscal deficits on economic growth, the paper uses standard macroeconomic time series data and 
a Structural Vector Auto Regression (SVAR) method. The application of this approach in fiscal policy 
was first done by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in the U.S., and has in recent periods been the basis 
of many studies undertaken to investigate the economic impact of fiscal policy, as analysed in 
section 3.2 of this chapter.  
The discussion of the research methodology is structured as follows: The literature on 
methodologies used to examine the economic effects of fiscal deficits is discussed in section 3.2, 
followed by section 3.3 which analyses the type and source of the time series data used in this study. 
Section 3.4 discusses the econometric techniques for the estimation of the economic effect of fiscal 
deficits. After that, section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
  
3.2 LITERATURE ON METHODOLOGIES 
According to Boussard et al (2012:3), the technique used to study the effects of fiscal deficits on 
economic growth has a major influence on the effectiveness of fiscal deficits. Moreover, Kirchner 
(2011:4) argues that the effectiveness of fiscal deficits differs, even across studies that use similar 
techniques. This paper employs a VAR methodology, SVAR to be specific, to measure estimate the 
economic impact of fiscal deficits. The VAR has its origin in the works of Sims (1980) to avoid the 
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unpleasant identification restrictions of large-scale structural simultaneous econometric models. 
These models required one to make a priori distinctions between which variables are endogenous 
and which are exogenous (Kilian, 2011:1).  
Sims (1980) believed that all variables should be treated the same, without any pre-existing 
assumptions about which variables are endogenous and exogenous. For this reason, he came up 
with the VARs, which assume that all variables within the model are endogenous. The VAR 
framework can accommodate any assumptions regarding endogeneity and causal effects. This, 
particularly, is useful for fiscal variables, since they often tend to be jointly determined thereby 
making it hard to assume a priori endogeinity and causality directions of the variables (Martin, 
2010:4). However, if the need arises for the exogeneity of some variables, Luetkepohl (2011:2) 
argues that this may be imposed in VAR models based on statistical procedures. Dummies are an 
example of variables which may be imposed exogenously in statistical VAR models. 
3.2.1 Types of VAR 
VARs, according to Stock & Watson (2001:101) come in three forms. These are the reduced VAR, the 
recursive VAR and the structural VAR.  
3.2.1.1 Reduced VAR 
The reduced VAR expresses each variable as a linear function of its own past values, the past values 
of all other variables being considered, and a serially uncorrelated error term (Stock & Watson, 
2001:102). The error terms become the shocks or innovations to the variables. It is referred to as 
reduced form because there are no contemporaneous variables that are included as explanatory 
variables on the right-hand side11 of the equation. To estimate a reduced form VAR, no restrictions 
need to be imposed beforehand on the equation. In other words, the data is allowed to speak for 
itself. This, however, comes at a price because such a model is only good for forecasting and not for 
structural analysis and policy evaluation (Stock & Watson 2001: 106). 
3.2.1.2 Recursive VAR 
The recursive VAR, according to Stock & Watson (2001:103) expresses variables in terms of their 
lagged values, lagged values of other variables and contemporaneous values of regressors. A 
recursive VAR imposes restrictions so that the error term in each regression equation is not 
correlated with the error term in the past equation within the system (Kilian, 2011:3). The 
                                                          
11
 All the equations in the reduced form VAR have the same form since they share the same right-hand side variables. 
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restrictions in a recursive VAR may involve ordering variables in such a way that the most 
endogenous is ordered first, as Bjonness (2012:13) points out. The imposed restrictions on a 
recursive VAR is, however, criticised by Amarasekara (2008:6) who argues that these restrictions 
amount to impositions made, using arbitrary mechanical methods and not necessarily based on 
economic theory, as may be the case with a structural VAR.  
3.2.1.3 Structural VARs 
In structural VARs, according to Stock & Watson (2001:103), economic theory is used to derive 
causal relationships from contemporaneous correlations among the variables. Structural VARs are 
structural models which are drawn from the reduced form VAR of shocks to obtain an economic 
interpretative function of the impulse response (Ravnik & Zulic, 2011:30). Because they are drawn 
from the reduced form VAR, structural VAR models can forecast, undertake structural analysis and 
policy evaluation. Since this is the methodology we use, section 3.5 offers more discussion on how it 
is implemented in this study.  
3.2.2 Advantages of VARs over large-scale simultaneous models   
VARs are popular in estimations compared to models, such as large-scale structural econometric 
models. They are popular because they do not depend much on existing economic theory and they 
are less prone to demands of distinguishing between exogenous and endogenous variables (Kilian 
2011:1). This is unlike large-scale structural models which Hakkio & Morris (1984:1) argue are bound 
on the basis of economic theory where variables which do not conform to economic theory are 
eliminated even if they are statistically significant. Sims (1980:2) points out that it is rare for 
economic theory to be sufficiently well defined. Because of that, exclusion restrictions of variables or 
exogeneity assumptions are likely to lead to the under-identification of a model. Hakkio & Morris 
(1984:1) point out that eliminating a variable based on theoretical explanations compromises the 
accuracy of the estimates. Hakkio & Morris (1984:1) contend that this is the major drawback of the 
large-scale structural models.  
Furthermore, large-scale Keynesian-type simultaneous equation models are less attractive compared 
to VARs. As Kilian (2011:2) points out, they require the inclusion of hundreds of variables in the 
model which are ‘incredible’12 to interpret. Typically, VARs contain less variables and equations 
(Bahovec & Erjavec, 2009: 16). In line with this argument, our study only uses five endogenous 
variables. Three advantages, compared to the large scale simultaneous equations, arise from the 
                                                          
12
 This is a term that Sims (1980:2) often used to describe the difficult faced in interpreting large-scale simultaneous 
equations. 
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compactness of the SVAR. Bahovec & Erjavec, (2009:16) list them as follows: one, they are easy to 
estimate; two, they avoid multicollinearity; and, three, they make it easier to interpret results and 
coefficients. In case of omission of an important variable in a VAR model, serially correlated error 
terms do reflect that (Bjonnes, 2012:14). 
The use of VARs is more suitable in developing countries than the large-scale models. This is because 
developing countries lack developed markets and quality data that have meaningful links and clear 
distinction between the endogenous and exogenous variables. See Bernanke & Mihov (1995:4) and 
Kirchner (2011:6). As such, the SVAR model is suitable in the study of a developing economy like 
South Africa.  
Many researchers use VARs, as they are easy to manage. Blanchard & Perotti (2002:1340) use the 
SVAR to analyse the effects of government spending and taxes on the post war U.S. economy.  They 
use institutional information about tax and transfer systems to identify the automatic response of 
taxes and spending activities. Their results are in line with traditional macroeconomic theory, where 
increase in government spending has a positive effect, and increase in tax has a negative effect on 
the economy. A number of other scholars have used the SVAR methodology in the U.S. and have 
confirmed the results obtained by Blanchard & Perotti (2002). See among others Fatas & Mihov 
(2001b), Mountford & Uhlig (2002).   
Giordano, Momigliano, Neri & Perotti (2008:76) use the SVAR to investigate the effect of fiscal policy 
in Italy. They find that a one per cent shock to government expenditure on goods and services raises 
private real GDP by 0.6 per cent after 3 quarters. However, after two years, this response reduces to 
zero.  
Besides the U.S. and Europe, ﬁscal SVAR models have also been applied to other countries. Here is 
just a brief list of those papers: Perotti (2002), De Arcangelis and Lamartine (2003) for OECD 
countries in general; Lozano and Rodriquez (2008) for Colombia; Du Plessis, Smith and Struzenegger 
(2008), and Jooste et al (2012) on South Africa; and Ilzetzki et al (2010) on developed and developing 
countries. In all these papers, SVAR models are used for simulating ﬁscal shocks, but they partially 
differ in the variables they use. Their findings are mixed. Some find positive effects, while others find 
negative ones.  
3.2.3 Criticisms of the VARs 
The VARs are not without criticism, however. The results obtained from them are criticised for being 
sensitive to model specification, sample size and the choice of the lag length (Bjonness, 2012:13). 
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Suffice to indicate, however, that nowadays this is not such a problem. As Bjonness (2012:13) points 
out, there are several tests that can be employed to check for the robustness and the stability of a 
model.  
Furthermore, some commentators have highlighted that VARs fall short because they do not offer 
information about the underlying structure of the economy but focus instead on the 
interrelationships of the economic variables (Hakkio & Morris, 1984:1). However, scholars like 
Amarasekara (2008:5) have played down this criticism, arguing that VARs are not designed to explain 
the structure of the economy but, rather, analyse the relationships between variables. Hakkio & 
Morris (1984:1) point out that “although VARs cannot make inferences about the structure of the 
economy, they can be used to estimate parameters of interest to policy makers”. 
3.2.4 The identification problem 
The most important concern about SVARs, perhaps, is that they require “identification assumptions” 
in order for correlations to be interpreted in a causal manner. See Stock & Watson (2001:101) and 
Kilian (2011:1). Identification assumptions refer to how one arranges the variables in a system of 
equations in order to solve the causation and correlation problems (Stock & Watson, 2001:102). In 
other words, as Stock & Watson (2001:103) put it, identification requires that all causal links in the 
system are spelled out, such that only a specific causal link is identified. Beetsma & Giuliodori 
(2011:9) and Kilian (2011:1) have argued that identification requires knowledge of institutions, 
economic theory and other extraneous constraints on the model responses. This is not an easy 
exercise, since SVAR results are sensitive to identification assumptions. Ravnik & Zulic (2011:37) 
argue that small changes in the identification process can create large changes in the impulse 
responses and, thus, change the results of the SVAR model.     
However, SVARs are important in this particular study because they allow us to impose identification 
about the error terms, so that we can look at individual shocks which are not correlated with other 
variable shocks. This is important because only if shocks are uncorrelated can we suspend some 
specific shocks and observe the impact of a particular shock of interest on another variable. In our 
case, it allows us, for instance, to suspend all other shocks, apart from the fiscal deficit variable 
shock, and observe how this shock affects real GDP.  
In this paper, we use the recursive identification approach, suggested by Sims (1980:2). The 
recursive identification approach involves the use of the Cholesky decomposition method to 
separate structural shocks from reduced form shocks by making the error terms in the reduced form 
VAR uncorrelated, which is commonly referred to as Orthogonalization. This is done in order to 
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facilitate make the interpretation of the resulting impulse response functions. It is Orthogonalization 
that enables us to implement the idea of isolating fiscal deficit shocks, suspend other specific shocks 
and see how real GDP reacts.  
Suffice to mention that there are several other methods that are used to identify equations in an 
SVAR model. Ravnik & Zulic (2011:28) cite the Structural Vector Error Correction model (SVEC) as 
one of them. Some scholars like Fatas & Mihov (2001:10) use the basic identification method of 
putting fiscal variables first, while the contemporaneous relationship of other variables is not 
specified. Kamps & Caldara (2008:28) compare various identification approaches and conclude that 
the Cholesky decomposition approach, with proper order of the variables in the model is one of the 
most appropriate methods of identifying variables. 
 
3.3 DATA 
The study uses quarterly macroeconomic time series data sets which span from 1991Q2 to 2012Q4. 
The first quarter in this study refers to the first three months of the Gregorian calendar, that is, 
January to March, and so on.  
 
Quarterly data, as opposed to annual data are employed in this study. Quarterly data have several 
advantages in comparison to annual data. Firstly, it is necessary to note, as De Castro & Garrote 
(2012:10) point out, decisions on fiscal policy are taken throughout the year and are often based on 
information gathered on a monthly or quarterly basis. As a result, quarterly data are better placed to 
capture this rich dynamic pattern of the decision-making process than the aggregate yearly data, 
which often contain large contemporaneous effects that complicate the analysis and the 
interpretation of results. See also Martins (2010:13) and Splimbergo et al (2009:5). Ilzetzki et al 
(2010:8) confirm that annual data are not good at producing precise estimates.  
 
Next, the use of quarterly data helps to minimise the likelihood of structural breaks and also 
increases the number of observations, or degrees of freedom. In South Africa, many structural 
breaks are eminent, due to several economic regime changes that have taken place. However, the 
use of quarterly data, as opposed to annual data helps to minimise the number of these structural 
breaks (Martins, 2010:14). On the other hand, many degrees of freedom realised from quarterly 
data are essential in enhancing the credibility of the estimates of a model. According to Martins 
(2010:14) the use of the VAR model normally results in the vanishing of degrees of freedom. The use 
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of quarterly rather than annual data, therefore, helps to minimise that loss of degrees of freedom by 
substantially increasing the sample size. 
 
Finally, some studies have argued that since fiscal policy is susceptible to the problem of lags, annual 
data should be used to account for this challenge. It, however, should be pointed out that even if 
lags are present, it is unrealistic to assume that an entire year is required for the authorities to 
respond to output shocks. Ilzetzki et al (2010:8) argue that many countries, including developing 
countries responded with discretionary measures as early as the first quarter of 2009 to the 
economic fallout in the fourth quarter of 2008. As such, the approach to using quarterly data is 
substantiated. 
Source and type of data 
In terms of the sources of the data, we use a local source. All the data is obtained from the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB, 2013). The SARB was chosen because it has a relatively long span of 
macroeconomic time series on South Africa and the data are consistent in terms of the units of 
measurement used. The data which we collected include:  
 
a) The two key variables of the study. The first, also serving as our dependent variable, is the 
log of real GDP (O) measured at 2005 market prices. GDP refers to expenditure on 
domestically produced goods and services, or economic activity. This variable is obtained 
from the SARB, while already seasonally adjusted. Figure 3.1 below shows the evolution of 
the log of real GDP over the forecast horizon. The graph gives the idea that GDP is non-
stationary, since it maintains an upward trend throughout the period, suggesting that the 
mean of GDP was perhaps changing. Discussion of the meaning of non-stationarity and 
how to address it is analysed in the next section. 
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Figure 3.1 
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The second key variable, also serving as one of the explanatory variables, is the real primary 
fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP (F), which is expressed in rates. As we defined it in 
chapter 1, a fiscal deficit refers to the surplus of government (public) expenditure over 
revenue (Dalyop, 2010:155). We use the primary deficit13 as opposed to the conventional 
deficit because, as Tshiswaka-Kashalala (2006:3) points out, the conventional fiscal deficit 
may not properly represent discretionary fiscal policy because it contains interest rate 
payments, which are not a fiscal discretionary component of the fiscal deficit. On the other 
hand, the primary fiscal deficit does not include interest payments, thus, making it suitable 
to capture government’s discretionary fiscal policy. We adjusted this variable for seasonality, 
using the TRAMO/SEAT ARIMA model14 with programme package Eviews 7.0. Figure 3.2 
below shows the pattern of the real primary fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP for the 
time frame of consideration. The graph shows that this variable is also not stationary.  
 
                                                          
13
 We subtracted interest payments from the conventional fiscal deficit in order to arrive at the primary fiscal deficit.  
14
 These seasonal adjustment technics were developed by Victor Gomez and Augustin Maravall, and are officially used by 
the Bank of Spain (Maravall, 2006). Their main advantage over other popular technics like the X-12 ARIMA used by the FED 
of the US is that they can handle missing as well as non-positive figures. 
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Figure 3.2 
    
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Primary fiscal deficit as a % of GDP Seasonally adjusted
1991Q2-2012Q4 
b) Apart from the above variables, there are other factors that are very important in 
determining the effectiveness of fiscal deficits. The mechanism through which they 
influence the effectiveness of fiscal deficits was discussed in the previous chapter. We, 
therefore, have to use these factors for controlling purposes in our analysis of the results 
in chapter 4. The first of these control factors is the real exchange rate, for which we use 
the real effective exchange- rate15 (X) because it captures the relative strength of the 
domestic currency against other currencies better than the ordinary exchange-rate. This is 
a critical variable. As argued in the literature review, there is a link between fiscal deficits 
and the monetary aspect of exchange rates. Fiscal deficits may theoretically lead to an 
appreciation of the real exchange-rate (Dalyop 2010:161). This could have a negative 
impact on the external competitiveness of the economy, thereby offsetting the positive 
economic effect of fiscal deficits.  
 
This variable is in rates and we seasonally adjusted it using the TRAMO-SEATS ARIMA 
model with programme package Eviews 7.0. Figure 3.3 below shows the evolution of the 
real effective exchange rate in South Africa from 1991 to 2012. The plot of this graph looks 
quite stationary. However, a more objective way of ascertaining whether this series is 
stationary is used in chapter 4. 
 
                                                          
15
 The real effective exchange-rate measures the strength of the Rand against a weighted average strength of 15 of South 
Africa’s major international trading economies.  
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Figure 3.3 
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c) Moreover, it was also discussed in chapter 2 that the effect of fiscal deficits differs, 
depending on the exchange rate regime used in a given economy. As Spilimbergo et al 
(2009:3), Ilzetzki et al (2010:11) among others argue fiscal policy is more effective in fixed 
exchange rate regimes compared to floating exchange rate regimes. The paper creates a 
dummy called dumreg to compare the impact of exchange rate regimes on the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy. In this dummy, dumreg = 0 represents periods (quarters) of 
fixed exchange rate regime, while dumreg = 1 represents periods (quarters) of floating 
exchange-rate regime.  Table 2.1 in the previous chapter showed a compilation of 
episodes of exchange-rate regimes that South Africa has passed through. It shows that 
from the time horizon of our consideration, it was only from 1991Q2 to 1994Q4 that 
South Africa was considered to be in a fixed exchange rate regime. This means that from 
1995Q1 to 2012Q4, the floating exchange rate was used in the economy. We verify in 
chapter 4 whether or not the dominance of the floating exchange-rate in South Africa 
over our forecast horizon does significantly hamper the effectiveness of fiscal deficits, as 
many scholars suggest.   
 
d) The next variable we include is trade as a percentage of GDP (T) in real terms. This 
measures the degree of openness of the economy. Openness of an economy, as discussed 
in chapter 2, has a critical influence on how fiscal deficits perform. Spilimbergo et al 
(2009:3) point out that the more open an economy is, the more likely fiscal deficits will be 
impotent. Theoretically, an open economy will result in the channelling of the income 
received from fiscal expenditure towards imports, thereby offsetting the current account 
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and GDP. With South Africa being a small open economy, we wait to verify in Chapter 4 if 
her openness to trade has an impact on the effectiveness of fiscal deficits.  
 
Trade as a percentage of GDP is measured as exports plus imports as a proportion of 
GDP16 (Dalyop, 2010:155). In other words, it measures the trade share of an economy. The 
higher the percentage of trade as a share of GDP, the more open the economy is. This 
type of approach to measuring the degree of openness of an economy, according to David 
(2007:9) is quite popular because it relies on the use of data for determination purposes, 
which data are normally readily available. In addition this approach makes it easy to make 
comparisons across studies of how economies are open (David, 2007:9). 
 
We have expressed the variable, trade as a percentage of GDP, in rates.  The series, which 
we used to calculate for this variable, were obtained from the SARB, already seasonally 
adjusted. Figure 3.4 below shows the plot of this variable over our time period of 
consideration. The graph exhibits non-stationarity tendencies for this variable, as the 
mean seems not to be constant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 This can be calculated using either current or constant prices (David 2007:9).  In our case, we used real values. 
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Figure 3.4 
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e) The base rate (B), or the interest rate policy of the central bank, is another important 
monetary policy variable that could have an influence on the effectiveness of fiscal 
deficits. We argued in chapter 2 that both the neoclassical economists and New 
Keynesians admit that fiscal deficits may raise interest rates. From the rise in interest 
rates, the neoclassical economists contend that this would automatically have a 
dampening effect on private investment and may have an adverse effect on fiscal deficits. 
On the other hand, the new Keynesians argue that interest rates may rise, but fiscal 
deficits would still spur investment given any level of interest rate.  
 
Moreover, we discussed in chapter 2 that the SARB follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule 
to implement its inflation-targeting monetary policy. The need to maintain inflation within 
the target range, using the short-term interest rate, may have offsetting effects on the 
effectiveness of fiscal deficits. For instance, if the rise in GDP arising from the increase in 
fiscal deficits mounts upward pressure on prices in the economy, the SARB may raise 
interest rates to cushion the rising prices and maintain them within the target range. This 
rise in interest rates may dampen investments and offset the stimulative effect of fiscal 
deficits. The inclusion of the interest rate variable in our model, therefore, helps us to 
evaluate the conclusion by Spilimbergo et al (2009:3) and Christiano et al (2009:17) that 
fiscal policy under inflation-targeting monetary policy is a failure. 
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We use the central bank repurchase rate (repo rate) to proxy the short-term interest rate 
policy of the central bank. The repurchase rate was introduced by the SARB in 1999, but 
prior to that, the bank rate was used to proxy the central bank interest policy rate (Dube 
& Zhou, 2003:197). We seasonally adjusted this variable using the TRAMO-SEATS ARIMA 
model with program package Eviews 7.0. Figure 3.5 below shows the trend of the repo 
rate since 1991. The variable seems to be stationary.   
  
Figure 3.5 
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f) Finally, the paper creates a dummy variable (dum11)17 to represent a structural break 
which took place in 2011Q4. We discovered this structural break after undertaking a 
stability diagnostic test of the residuals in the equation using program package Eviews 7.0. 
In this diagnosis, we rejected at 5% level the Chow Breakpoint test null hypothesis stating 
that there was no structural break in the fourth quarter of 2011. Adding structural break 
dummies in a VAR model when structural breaks are observed in the data improves the 
specification and stability of the model. Figure 3.6 shows a graph depicting the structural 
break that took place in 2011Q4 when the test statistic broke out of the 5% interval.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Dum11 takes values of 0 from 1991Q2 to 2011Q4, and values of 1 from 2012Q1 to 2012Q4.  
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Figure 3.6 
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3.4 ECONOMETRIC TOOLS 
As mentioned earlier, this study uses time series data. A time series is defined by Gourieroux & 
Monfort (1997:1) as “the sequence of observations on one variable”. The data in these series may be 
available, for example, once a year or once a quarter. They come from repeated observations, 
corresponding to different dates. 
3.4.1 Challenges to time series data and solutions 
Time series data are a problem to use in research activities. The problem is that they often tend to 
have unit roots. Unit root is a term that implies that the data is non-stationary. A non-stationary 
series has a mean or variance, or both, that vary over time (Gujarati, 2003: 797). Gujarati (2003:797) 
contends that using such data would require that each set of time series data should be for a 
particular episode and, as such, it is not possible to generalise it to other periods. Using such time 
series in regressions produces results that appear to be true, when actually they are false. It so 
happens that a regression involving two non-stationary variables would produce a high adjusted R-
Squared18 when actually no relationship exists (Gujarati, 2003:797). Not taking action to make the 
data stationary can lead, therefore, to false results. Moreover, the VAR model that we use in this 
                                                          
18
 The adjusted R-squared is used to determine the fitness of a model. The higher it is, the better fitted a model is.  
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study requires, in the first place, that all the data used are stationary, or else the results would be 
invalid.  
 
The graphical analysis made in section 3.4 already highlights that most of the time series used in this 
study are suspected to be non-stationary because they have sustained trends and random walk 
movements with drifts. However, a more objective way of assessing whether unit roots are present, 
and how to address them, is required. A number of methods are used to detect unit roots. One of 
them is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF), named after its discoverers (Cheung & Lai 1995: 
177). The ADF is based on random walk movements in time series and the fact that random walks 
have unit roots. It assumes that the explained variable ( ) follows an auto-regressive (AR) process of 
order p, that is,  and adds p lagged differenced terms of the  time series to the right hand 
side of the regression. The null hypothesis of the ADF test states that unit roots are present in the 
time series. The alternative hypothesis, on the other hand, states that there are no unit roots in the 
time series. The ADF, according to Cheung & Lai (1995:177) is effective and is easy to apply and, for 
that reason, we find it appropriate to use in this study.  Another technique available for detecting 
unit roots is the Phillips-Perron test (1988). However, for reasons we have already indicated, we use 
the ADF in this study.   
3.4.1.1 Differencing 
There are a number of methods used to address unit roots in time series data in order to make them 
stationary. Differencing is one of the easiest ways. Differencing19 refers to the series of changes of a 
time series from one period to the next.  The number of differencing operations that it takes to 
make the series stationary is known as the order of integration (Gujarati, 1995: 719). It is denoted as 
I(d). If it takes one differencing operation to make a series stationary, that operation would be 
expressed as I(1). By convention if d=0, the resulting I(0) expression entails that the time series is 
stationary. Differencing operation can be done using the ADF.   
 
Though it is an easy way of addressing unit roots, differencing has disadvantages. A number of 
researchers have condemned it, arguing that it may result in the loss of important data.  In addition, 
a model that only includes (lagged) differenced variables assumes that the impact of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable never last longer than one time period 
                                                          
19
 If Yt denotes the value of the time series Y at period t, then the first difference of Y at period t is equal to   
Yt -Yt-1 
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(Mukherjee, White and Wuyts, 1998:407). This may not be correct. Moreover, Mukherjee et al. 
(1998:407) point out that using a regression with differenced variables yields no information on the 
long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables of consideration. As such, differenced 
variables are often thought of as representing only the short-run relationship.  
3.4.1.2 Cointegration  
Because of the inadequacy of the differencing method, this study employs the cointegration 
technique. The concept of cointegration was popularised by Robert Engle and Clive Granger in 1987. 
Their analysis was based on the argument that if two or more time series of the same order of 
integration, say I(1),  are linearly combined and produce I(0) residuals,  it means that those variables 
are cointegrating in the long run. Such variables can also be said to form an equilibrium relationship 
in the long-run. In other words, variables are cointegrated with one another if the residuals from the 
levels regression are stationary (Mukherjee et al, 1998: 399).  
 
Testing if our model cointegrates is critical for our SVAR, as it determines whether or not our 
regressions are spurious. If our model cointegrates, it confirms that we are estimating a stationary 
model, and our regressions are not spurious.  
 
Previously, cointegration analysis was predominantly undertaken for purposes of estimating 
“Restricted VAR models” or Vector Error Correction Models (VECM). This implies that unrestricted 
VARs, such as the one we use in this study, would not have to go through the process of 
cointegration tests. However, cointegration analysis, perhaps, is currently considered to be more 
important in unrestricted VAR analyses. As Baharumshah (2005:30) points out, “estimating the 
unrestricted VAR model for the cointegrated variables is a normal route taken by much of the 
literature”.  Furthermore, Ramaswamy & Slok (1998:380) argue that when variables are cointegrated 
it is better to apply an unrestrictive SVAR than a restricted one. This, Ramaswamy & Slok (1998:380) 
argue, “is because restricted VARs imply that the effect of a given shock is permanent, while that of 
an unrestricted VAR allows history to decide on whether the impact of a shock is permanent or not, 
which is desirable”.  
 
In line, therefore, with this literature, if we discover that our variables cointegrate, we will proceed 
with the estimation of an unrestricted SVAR model. There is need to mention however, that we will 
also run a VECM for the sole purpose of using it as a recommended method for determining 
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causality in multivariable models. We discuss the use of VECM in determining causality in section 
3.5.5.1 below.   
 
In this study, we use the Johansen approach to test for cointegration. This approach involves the 
application of standard multivariate calculations in the context of a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) 
system. The Johansen approach allows for more than one cointegrating relation. In other words, it 
allows for the testing of cointegration in multivariate models (Mukherjee et al, 1998:399). This 
technique is, therefore, a suitable one for the multivariable model that we have in this study. The 
number of cointegrating vectors in our model can be up to 4, since we have 5 endogenous variables 
in the model. Moreover, we choose the Johansen approach, because of its ability to incorporate 
structural breaks and dummies in the tests for cointegration, as done by Thornton & Lusinyan 
(2009:864). This is important in our case because we have a structural break dummy and a dummy 
for the exchange rate regimes in our model. 
 
Typically, the Johansen cointegration approach was designed to handle variables that are I(1) 
integrated. In our case, there is a possibility that we might also have variables which are I(0).  
However, Johansen (1991:1560) argues that there is still no problem with combining I(0) and I(1) 
variables when testing for cointegration. See also Harris (1995:80). This, he argues, is because, if 
some variables are I(0) instead of I(1), they will reveal themselves through cointegrating vectors 
whose space is spanned by the stationary variables in the model (Johansen, 1991: 1560). 
 
The Johansen approach has two types of tests.  These are the trace statistic and the maximum 
Eigenvalue statistic. Either one of the two tests or both can be used as a benchmark for deciding the 
number of cointegrating relationships in the model, as argued by Lutkepohl, Saikkonen, Trenkler 
(2001:305). However, they caution that the trace test has more power when handling more than 
one cointegrating relationship, while the Eigenvalue test is suitable for one cointegrating 
relationship (Lutkepohl et al, 2001:305). 
 
The trace test is a joint test with a null hypothesis which states that the number of cointegrating 
relations is less or equal to r. The r is also called the ‘rank’ and it determines the number of 
cointegrating vectors. If r = 0, it means there is zero cointegration relations in the model. Its 
alternative hypothesis, on the other hand, is a general one which states that there are more than r 
cointegrating vectors (Johansen 1991: 1554).  
 
 
 
 
 
 42 
 
In the maximum Eigenvalue test, separate tests on each Eigenvalue are conducted. Its null 
hypothesis states that there are r cointegrating relations. The alternative hypothesis, on the other 
hand, states that there are r + 1 cointegrating vectors (Johansen 1991: 1554).  
3.4.1.3 Deterministic trend assumptions and lag length 
The output of the Johansen approach cointegration tests is sensitive to the deterministic trend 
assumptions used for the time series and the lag order choice. A slight change in information on any 
of these, results in a change in the number of cointegrating vectors outputted.  The Johansen 
cointegration system in E-views 7.0 asks for this information, and it is therefore important to input it 
correctly. From the preliminary investigation of our time series, based on graphical appearance, we 
observe that they have intercepts/constant, and a trend.  Graphical appearance, as we discuss in 
chapter 4, is however, not an objective way of deciding the deterministic trend assumptions of the 
data. A more robust way of doing this is shown in the next chapter where, in the process of testing 
for unit roots, we also discover the correct and significant deterministic trend assumptions for our 
series. As for the lag order choice, we use the VAR lag order selection criteria in E-views 7.0. More 
discussion on lag choice selection follows in the next section.    
3.4.2 The SVAR model for analysing deficits 
There are different classes of SVAR models (E-views 7.0: 472). The one we use may broadly be 
written as: 
   = 𝜀t …………………………………………………………………………………………….……….………….…………..1 
In the above equation,  and 𝜀t are vectors of length K.  are the observed (or reduced form) 
residuals, while 𝜀t are the unobserved structural disturbances. The structural disturbances (𝜀t) in the 
equation are orthonormal or uncorrelated with each other by assumption, that is, their variance-
covariance matrix  is diagonal.  and  are endogenous K x K matrices to be estimated. 
Following this broad analysis, the objective of this paper is to estimate this specific SVAR system: 
 …………………………………………..……………………………….……….2
     
In this system,  is a cointegrated K variable vector, where K includes the following endogenous 
variables: the real primary fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP (F), real trade as a percentage of GDP 
(T), real effective exchange rate (X), log of real GDP (O), and the short-term real interest rate or base 
rate (B). K also includes  matrix of exogenous variables, which are: exchange rate regimes dummy 
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(dumreg) and the 2011 structural break (dum11). A deterministic component may also be added as 
an exogenous variable. The process of testing for unit roots, which is done in the next chapter, aids 
to reveal the deterministic nature of our series.  
 
In the same SVAR system above, t represents a quarter or three consecutive months in the 
Gregorian calendar. , is a matrix of the own and cross-effect of the  lag of the variables on their 
current observations. The  matrix allows for the possibility of the contemporaneous relation 
contained in the vector  of the variables.  is another component which we need to estimate in 
our structural VAR. Actually, the representation of this structural form is referred to in the literature 
as the  model (Luetkepohl 2006: 364). The structural model can be said to be identified only if 
restrictions are imposed to  and .  
 
The recursive identification approach which we use restricts  to a K dimensional diagonal matrix. In 
other words,  is a diagonal matrix, implying that the vector [ F, T, X, O, B ] is an 
orthogonal vector corresponding to reduced-form residuals. Some literatures use an  identity 
matrix with a unit diagonal. However, the E-views 7.0 guideline: 472, argues that most of the 
literatures use a diagonal matrix where values that need to be estimated are assigned the label NA20. 
We thus, follow this argument by allowing our SVAR to estimate values for the diagonal matrix, as 
we show below on the matrix to the right:  
 
    =    
On the other hand, we restrict  (the matrix to the left, above) to a lower triangular matrix with a 
unit diagonal. This implies that the variance-covariance matrix captured in  must be 
decomposed. The decomposition is derived from the Cholesky decomposition   = FF’ by defining 
a diagonal matrix P which has the same main diagonal as F, and by specifying  =   and  
= PP’. This implies that the elements on the main diagonal of P and F are equal to the standard 
deviation of the respective structural innovation (Kamps & Caldara, 2008:13). What this essentially 
means is that, the  in our SVAR system describes the relation between the structural 
disturbances (𝜀t) and the reduced form disturbance ( ).  
                                                          
20
 In e-views NA represents a value that is unrestricted or rather, needs to be estimated in the SVAR model. In the diagonal 
matrix system that we use, it means that we identify  by putting NA in a diagonal form.  
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3.4.2.1 The recursive causal chain for the SVAR model  
The recursive identification approach which we use requires the imposition of a particular causal 
relationship, based on economic theory from the data (Kilian 2011:5). This implies that VARs are not 
completely atheoretic, since they require economic theory to be followed.  In most cases, though, it 
is rare to find a fully developed theoretical model on which to base the causal chain. Kilian (2011:8) 
argues that in such cases “identification may be achieved by using extraneous information or by 
using selective insights from economic theory”. Using this approach helps to make the causal chain 
relationship general and uncontentious. 
We follow the Kilian (2011:8) suggestion, just mentioned above, and combine it with the basic 
identification procedure of Fatas & Mihov (2001b:10) and Blanchard & Perotti (2002) who order 
fiscal variables before output. We, thus, order our variables as follows: fiscal deficit (F) ― trade as a 
percentage of GDP (T) ― real effective exchange-rates (X) ― log of real GDP (O) ― base rate (B).  
The implication of this causal order is that the fiscal deficit affects all the variables in the system at 
the same time in the first period. In the next period, any shock affects all the variables, all the 
variables have lags included in each other’s equations. In other words, any shock can affect all the 
variables with a delay lag.    
The equations below can be used to explain the recursive causal relationship identified above. It can 
be seen that the contemporaneous fiscal deficit is included as an explanatory variable in equations 4 
to 7. Similarly, trade as a percentage of GDP is a contemporaneous explanatory variable in equations 
5 to 7.  The same pattern is applicable to the rest of the variables. Of course, the lag of one which we 
use below is just for demonstration purposes. The lag length could go beyond the length we have 
used. The Greek symbol  represents the structural shocks to the models. By custom, the size of a 
shock is set equal to its standard deviation. 
  
 Fttttttt BOXTFF    15141312110 ………………………….………..…...3
    
 
 
T
tttttttt BOXTFFT    161514131210 …………………..…….…..4 
 
 
X
ttttttttt BOXTFTFX    1716151413210
……………………………………….5 
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 
O
tttttttttt BOXTFXTFO    18171615143210
.........................6 
 
 
B
tttttttttt BOXTFOXTFB    191817161543210
…………..………….7 
The ordering of these variables was guided by the following economic assumptions. The primary 
fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP affects all the variables in the system in the same period 
because it appears as a contemporaneous explanatory variable for all of them, as shown above. This, 
as we argued in chapter 2, helps us to analyse whether fiscal deficits (1) are leaked out of the 
economy through increased imports, as captured by the increase in trade as a percentage of GDP; 
(2) lead to the appreciation of the real exchange rate, which may have negative consequences on 
net exports and GDP; (3) have a discretionary effect on GDP- this particular ordering rules out 
potentially important contemporaneous effects of automatic stabilizers on fiscal deficit, which can 
affect the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth and; (4) lead to the increase in interest rates. 
An increase in interest rates, according to neoclassical economists crowds-out private investment 
and appreciates the real exchange-rate. Both of these may negatively affect the impact of fiscal 
deficits, as we discussed in chapter 2. 
Trade as a percentage of GDP and real effective exchange-rate are ordered before real GDP so that 
we can analyse the net exports position of the economy after a fiscal shock has been subjected to 
them. As we discussed in the previous chapter, the appreciation of the real exchange-rate and the 
increase in imports for open economies may cause a negative trade balance, thereby minimising the 
fiscal multiplier.  
Finally, we order the short-term real interest rate (base rate) last. We give two justifications for 
ordering this variable last. Firstly, based on the argument made in the previous chapter, the SARB 
pursues an inflation-targeting monetary policy, where interest rate changes are bound by the need 
to maintain inflation at the targeted level as GDP changes. This means that the obligation to fix 
inflation at a certain level may compel the SARB to change the interest rate in the direction that 
offsets the stimulative effect of the fiscal deficit. Secondly, the fiscal deficit, as we define it, 
represents the primary deficit, which excludes interest payments. We want to verify whether the 
fiscal deficit variable does not react to changes in the interest rate.  
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
3.4.2.2 Estimation of the SVAR model 
The matrix  and the coefficients  and   are what we aim to estimate. Estimation of VAR 
regressions is normally done using the Ordinary least squares (OLS). However, Luetkepohl (2011:8) 
points out that the OLS may be inefficient in cases where restrictions must be imposed on the 
parameters, such as what we do in this study. In view of that, we estimate our regression using the 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS). Luetkepohl (2011:8) argues that the GLS is beneficial when 
restrictions to parameters are imposed, and this estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal 
under general conditions.  The GLS, thus, will provide us with the above estimates.  
3.4.3 Lag length selection 
Before estimation can be done, determination of the optimal lag length is always a prerequisite 
when dealing with VAR models. In our case, we combine statistical criteria and economic theory to 
determine the lag length. For the statistical criteria, we use the VAR lag choice selection criterion 
which is incorporated in the E-views 7.0 statistical package. We apply this criterion while cautious of 
the warning by Gujarati (2004: 733) that the more the lags that one adds to the model, the more the 
degrees of freedom get consumed. On the other hand, not including a lag at all in the model may be 
rejected on economic grounds, since it takes a quarter or more for fiscal policy to react (Bjonness 
2012:15). We perform the lag selection procedure in the next chapter.  
3.4.4 Residual diagnostic tests 
Residual tests describe the distribution and characteristics of the residuals in the model. These tests 
are very important, for they determine the credibility of the conclusions drawn from a model. We 
follow the standard practice of testing the residuals for serial correlation, normality distribution and 
heteroskedasticity. In addition, we test for the stability of our SVAR, using the inverse roots of the AR 
characteristic polynomial.  
3.4.4.1 Serial correlation 
Serial correlation, also known as autocorrelation, is a serious problem in time series data. Serially 
correlated error terms underestimate the standard errors, thereby making the t-values 
overestimated. This renders the estimates biased. We use the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM 
test to test for serial correlation. The null hypothesis for this test states that there is no serial 
correlation in the model. 
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3.4.4.2 Normality test 
A normality test investigates whether the residuals in a model are normally distributed. Estimates 
derived from a model whose residuals are not normally distributed are invalid. We, therefore, have 
to undertake this test. We use the Jarque-Bera normality test to ascertain the distribution of the 
residuals in our model. The null hypothesis for this test states that the residuals are not normally 
distributed. 
3.4.4.3 Heteroskedasticity  
Heteroskedasticity means that residuals do not have a constant variance. This results in a model 
which has diﬀerent probability distributions. Such a model cannot yield reliable estimates. We use 
the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity to analyse heteroskedasticity in our model. 
The null hypothesis for this test states that the residuals have no heteroskedasticity. 
3.4.4.4 Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial   
Finally, since we are running an SVAR model, it is also important that we test for the stability of our 
model. We use the technique called the “Inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial” to ascertain 
the stability of our SVAR. In this test, if the Inverse roots of the AR polynomial have roots with 
modulus which are less than one and they lie within the unit circle, it means that the model is stable 
and the impulse response standard errors would be valid and the conclusions of the model would 
also be reliable.  
3.4.5 SVAR Results 
In analysing the results from our SVAR model, we follow the standard practice of reporting results 
from the Granger-causality tests, impulse responses and the forecast error variance decompositions. 
The E-views 7.0 package we use in this study, and many other econometrics packages, such as, TSP 
and RATS, can compute these statistics automatically. Stock & Watson (2001:104) argue that 
because VARs have complicated dynamics, reporting these statistics is more informative than using 
the regression coefficients or R2    statistics. 
3.4.5.1 Causality test 
The concept of causality is attributed to Engle Granger (1969) who explained that if X Granger causes 
Y, then past values of X should contain information which helps to predict Y.  This culminated in 
what is commonly known as the Granger causality test. However, the normal Granger –causality test 
is more suitable for bivariate equations. Lutkepohl (2006:76) points out that the normal Granger 
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causality test is not reliable in a VAR with more than two variables. A Granger causality test which is 
appropriate for handling more than two variables requires the use of the VECM. Maddala & Kim, 
(1998:297) argue that Granger causality for multivariate equations can be subdivided into long-run 
and short-run causality using the VECM. This can be done only after establishing that a cointegration 
relationship exists among the variables. Maddala & Kim (1998:297) argue that the long-run causality 
is determined by the error correction term. If the error term coefficient is statistically significant and 
has a negative sign, it indicates that long-run causality runs from the independent variables, jointly, 
to the dependent variable. The short-run causality, on the other hand, as argued by Maddala & Kim, 
(1998:298), is determined by a test of the joint significance of the lagged independent variables. The 
F-test or the Wald tests can be used in this case. We do these tests in the next chapter.  
3.4.5.2  Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) 
SVARs, like recursive VARs, are typically interpreted using Impulse Response Functions (IRFs). IRFs 
are used to trace out the time path of various innovations (shocks) that are in the SVAR system. 
Stock & Watson (2001:106) point out that “impulse responses trace out the response of current and 
future values of each of the variables to a one unit increase in the current value of one of the VAR 
errors, assuming that this error returns to zero in subsequent periods and that all other errors are 
equal to zero”. IRFs can be achieved through expressing variables in the model in terms of shocks.  
We use IRFs to interpret results because using individual coefficients from an estimated SVAR is 
difficult (Bjonness, 2012:14). 
3.4.5.3 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) 
According to Stock & Watson (2001:106) “the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) is the 
percentage of the variance of the error made in forecasting a variable (say, GDP) due to a specific 
innovation (say, the error term in the fiscal deficit equation) at a given horizon (like two years)”. 
Whereas the IRF trace the effect of an innovation to an endogenous variable on the variables in the 
VAR system, the FEVD gives information about the relative importance of each random shock or 
innovation to the variables in the VAR system. The IRF together with the FEVD constitute what is 
known as “Innovation accounting” 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter addressed the methodology that would be used to investigate the effectiveness of fiscal 
deficits in stimulating economic growth in South Africa.  We argued that macroeconomic time series 
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data would be applied in an SVAR model in order for us to determine whether or not fiscal deficits 
have a stimulative effect on the South African economy. We analysed the source and type of time 
series data that are appropriate for our study. We examined problems associated with the use of 
time series data, and how to resolve them. The SVAR technique was discussed and we discovered 
that, despite the challenge of how to make “identification assumptions”, it is a better technique to 
use in investigating the economic effectiveness of fiscal policy. We also examined the diagnostic 
tests that would be used to assess the efficiency and validity of our estimates. 
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter empirically investigates the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in South Africa. 
Specifically, it answers the questions raised in chapter 1:  What is the effect of fiscal deficits on South 
Africa’s economic growth and what factors are expected to explain it? The decision on whether fiscal 
deficits are an effective stimulatory policy in South Africa depends on the conclusions we draw from 
the following hypotheses: Fiscal deficits lead to a positive effect on economic growth, our null 
hypothesis (H0). The alternative hypothesis (H1), states that fiscal deficits have an effect on economic 
growth which is equal to or less than zero. If our results show an effect, which is statistically 
significantly positive, we should conclude that fiscal deficits are effective in stimulating economic 
growth in South Africa. Otherwise, the alternative hypothesis is accepted and we conclude that fiscal 
deficits are not effective in stimulating economic growth in South Africa.  
As part of answering our research question, we also analyse factors that may explain the 
effectiveness of fiscal deficits on economic growth. For this reason, our model includes important 
variables for the analysis of the mechanism through which the economic impact of fiscal deficits may 
have been affected.  
To determine the effectiveness of fiscal deficits, an SVAR model, which we re-write below from 
chapter three, is used. As stated, this model includes the real primary fiscal deficit as a percentage of 
GDP (F), the real trade as a percentage of GDP (T), the real effective exchange rate (X), the log of real 
GDP (O) and the short-term real interest rate of the central bank (B), as endogenous variables. It also 
includes exogenous variables: the exchange-rate regimes dummy (dumreg) and the 2011 structural 
break (dum11).     
  
To answer our research question, we organise this chapter as follows: in order to address the 
problem of unit roots, which in chapter 3 were discussed as being a serious problem in time series 
data, we use section 4.2 to detect the presence of unit roots and address them. The ADF method is 
used to detect unit roots, while the Johansen cointegration technique is used to address them. 
Section 4.3 discusses the diagnostic tests of the residuals and the stability of the SVAR model which 
we use in this study. This is important because the validity and reliability of our estimates and 
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conclusions strongly depend on these tests. After satisfying that prerequisite, we estimate the SVAR 
in section 4.4. We use the standard procedure in VAR models of reporting the Granger causality test, 
the impulse response functions and the variance decomposition analysis. In all these reports, the 
short-run and long-run relationship outcomes are considered. Section 4.5 concludes chapter. 
 
4.2 UNIT ROOT TESTS AND HOW TO ADDRESS THEM 
4.2.1 Initial investigation of the data 
Before undertaking a formal test for unit roots, Gujarati & Porter (2009:749) advise that a graphical 
analysis by visually plotting the time series should be done. They justify this by arguing that a 
graphical representation of the series provides a primary clue of the expected nature of the series 
with regard to the inclusion or not of a trend, constant/intercept term or both in the model. Our 
series are plotted in section 3.4 of chapter 3. Based on figures 3.1 to 3.5, the visual analysis of our 
series is as follows: The log of real GDP (Fig 3.1) has a constant term and maintains an upward time 
trend starting from the early 1990s. However, following the economic recession, it slightly declined 
in 2008 and then continued with the upward trend. On the other hand, the primary fiscal deficit as a 
percentage of GDP (Fig 3.2) has mainly been in the negative region, meaning that for most of the 
period, government expenditure (excluding expenditure on interest payments) was more than the 
revenue collected. The sharpest increases in the fiscal deficit were witnessed in the years 1993 and 
2008. This time series has a constant term and shows random walk movement with time trend drifts 
in some periods, meaning that it is not stationary. The next time series, which is the real effective 
exchange-rate (Fig 3.3), is fairly stationary in the main, as its mean and variance seem to be constant 
throughout the period. Trade as a percentage of GDP, according to Fig 3.4, has a constant term and a 
time trend. This graph also shows that from the beginning of the sample period, the share of trade 
to GDP was increasing until 2008 when the economy was hit by a recession, making it decline and 
then rise again. Finally, the short-term real interest rate appears to have no constant term and is, 
fairly, stationary. However, a formal way of assessing if it is stationary is done below. 
4.2.2 The ADF test for unit roots 
The above analysis is not objective enough, as we cannot be sure about the stationarity or non-
stationarity of the variables. A formal hypothesis testing approach for unit roots is required. The 
approach we use to test for unit roots as discussed in chapter 3 is the ADF, which has a null 
hypothesis, stating that unit roots are present in the series. This approach requires the use of trend 
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deterministic assumptions. Based on the visual graphical analysis made above, we apply the 
following trend deterministic assumptions, as specified in E views package 7.0, which we use, 
‘intercept term’, ‘intercept term and trend’, and ‘none’. Table 4.1 below shows results from the unit 
roots tests we have done for each of the five endogenous variables. 
Table 4.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test 
                                   ADF Test 
Variables Level 1st Difference Robust deterministic trends 
Fiscal deficit as % of GDP (F) -0.65 -11.69* None 
Trade as % of GDP (T) 1.41 -5.56* None 
Effective Exchange rate (X) -8.96* - None 
Real GDP (O) 0.12 -4.06* Intercept 
Base rate (B) -6.20* - Intercept 
Source: Author’s compilation;  
* Denotes that we reject the null-hypothesis at 5% level of significance. The Schwarz Information Criterion is 
used to determine the lag order.   
Table 4.1 shows that, except for the real effective exchange-rate and the base rate, all the other 
variables are non-stationary at level. The non-stationary variables all become stationary after the 
first difference. Contrary to the trend deterministic assumptions based on our visual graphical 
analysis, the ADF test reveals that our series predominantly exhibit the no constant/no trend, and 
constant deterministic assumptions. Because of this pattern, in all our VAR estimations we assume 
that there is no deterministic trend in our model and choose the option in E-views which states that 
there is ‘no intercept or trend’.   
4.2.3 Test for cointegration 
We cannot run a model based on variables that are non-stationary. Doing so would produce 
spurious regressions. However, as we argued in chapter 3, if the series in the model, even if some 
are non-stationary, are able to form stationary residuals I(0) when they are regressed together, their 
regressions will not be spurious. This is because those series form a long-run equilibrium 
relationship, and they cointegrate, which is desirable. We use the Johansen cointegration test to 
ascertain if our model forms a long-run equilibrium relationship. Before we can apply the Johansen 
cointegration test, however, it is imperative that we determine the optimal lag length for our model, 
as the Johansen cointegration test is sensitive to the number of lags chosen.  
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Lag order choice 
We use the lag length selection criteria to determine the optimal lag length for our model. As 
mentioned earlier, we use the option ‘no intercept or trend’ as our trend deterministic assumption 
in this test. Table 4.2 below shows our lag order choice outcome. 
Table 4.2 VAR Lag order selection criteria  
 
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -588.2858 NA   2.956052  15.27306  15.72295  15.45330 
1 -181.1271  731.8548  0.000186  5.598155   6.797875*  6.078800 
2 -134.4354  78.01663  0.000109  5.048996  6.998542   5.830044* 
3 -106.6264   42.94548*   0.000104*  4.977883  7.677254  6.059334 
4 -81.44483  35.70045  0.000108   4.973287*  8.422483  6.355140 
5 -59.75784  28.00093  0.000127  5.057160  9.256182  6.739417 
6 -41.11828  21.70683  0.000167  5.218184  10.16703  7.200844 
7 -24.08847  17.67651  0.000240  5.419961  11.11863  7.703024 
8  3.932467  25.53806  0.000278  5.343482  11.79198  7.926947 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
 
 We choose the lag length of 4 based on the result suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). We do this because this lag length is the generally accepted lag order choice in empirical fiscal 
policy studies. This can be verified in studies by Blanchard & Perotti (2002), Ilzetzk et al (2010) and 
Kamps & Caldara (2008). A smaller lag length, as suggested by other criteria, can be rejected on 
economic grounds. This is because, theoretically, it takes more than one quarter for the effects of 
fiscal policy to be registered in the economy. 
4.2.4 Johansen cointegration approach 
Having made a decision on the lag order choice and the trend deterministic assumptions, we can 
now investigate if our model forms a long-run equilibrium relationship using the Johansen 
cointegration approach. Suffice to mention that the unit root tests in table 4.1 reveal that our series 
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exhibit I(0) and I(1) variables. Typically, the Johansen cointegration approach was designed to handle 
variables that are integrated I(1). However, Johansen (1991: 1560) argues that there is still no 
problem with combining I(0) and I(1) variables when testing for cointegration. This, he argues, is 
because, if some variables are I(0) instead of I(1), they will reveal themselves through cointegrating 
vectors whose space is spanned by the stationary variables in the model (Johansen, 1991: 1560). 
As we mentioned in chapter 3, the Johansen cointegration approach has two tests for cointegration. 
These are the Trace test and the Maximum Eigenvalue tests. 
4.2.4.1 Trace test 
Table 4.3 below shows the results from the trace test for cointegration.  
Table 4.3 Trace test: Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4 
  
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.307877  74.70842  60.06141  0.0018  
At most 1 *  0.266434  44.53317  40.17493  0.0171  
At most 2  0.151509  19.12646  24.27596  0.1946  
At most 3  0.059812  5.654240  12.32090  0.4794  
At most 4  0.007252  0.596833  4.129906  0.5012  
      
       Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
 
In this test, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no cointegrating vector in our model. This is 
because at this rank (number of cointegrating vectors) the trace statistic value of approximately 
74.71 is greater than the 5% critical value of about 60.06. Next, the null-hypothesis that there is at 
most 1 cointegration relationship, is also rejected, because at this rank the trace statistic value of 
approximately 44.53 is greater than the 5% critical value of about 40.17. We, however, do not reject 
the null hypothesis which states that there are at most 2 cointegrating relations. This is because at 
this rank the trace statistic value of approximately 19.13 is less than the 5% critical value of about 
24.28. 
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4.2.4.2 Maximum Eigenvalue test 
Table 4.4 below shows the results from the maximum Eigenvalue cointegration test. 
Table 4.4 Maximum Eigenvalue test:  Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4 
 
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None  0.307877  30.17525  30.43961  0.0539  
At most 1 *  0.266434  25.40671  24.15921  0.0338  
At most 2  0.151509  13.47222  17.79730  0.1990  
At most 3  0.059812  5.057407  11.22480  0.4692  
At most 4  0.007252  0.596833  4.129906  0.5012  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
 
In this test, we do not reject the null hypothesis, that there are no cointegrating relations. This is 
because at this rank the maximum Eigen statistic of approximately 30.18 is less than the 5% critical 
value of about 30.44.  
Based on the two Johansen cointegration tests, we have two conflicting numbers of cointegrating 
relations. The trace test gives us 2, while the maximum Eigenvalue test gives us 0. Literature advises 
that either of the two tests can be used as a benchmark to determine the number of cointegrating 
vectors in the model (Lutkepohl et al, 2001: 305). These researchers conclude, however, that the 
Trace test produces more robust findings than the Eigenvalue test. This is because the trace test has 
more power when analysing more than one cointegrating relations, while the eigenvalue test is 
suitable in analysing one cointegrating relationship (Lutkepohl et al, 2001:305).   
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that 2 is the total number of cointegrating relations we 
have in our model. This is desirable as we now know that our model forms an equilibrium 
relationship in the long run, and that we can run a VECM to use for determining causality in our 
model without getting spurious regressions. The other interesting finding in this test is that we have 
discovered that I(0) and I(1) variables are able to give us cointegrating relations. This conforms to the 
argument by Johansen (1991:1560) that variables with different levels of integration may be 
cointegrated. See also Harris (1995:80).   
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4.3 RESIDUAL DIAGNOSTIC CHECKS 
Before we show our estimated results, it is necessary to begin by analysing the residuals from our 
estimated SVAR model. This analysis determines whether the results which we show in the next 
section, are efficient and reliable.  We undertake the following residual diagnostic tests: serial 
correlation based on the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test, normality based on the Jarque-Bera 
test, and heteroskedasticity based on the White heteroskedasticity test. The null hypotheses for 
these diagnostic tests are that there is no serial correlation, no normality and no heteroskedasticity, 
respectively.  In addition, we undertake inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial in order to 
analyse the stability of our VAR. 
4.3.1 Test for serial correlation or Autocorrelation   
Correlation of a variable with itself over successive time periods (serial correlation) is a normal 
problem faced in time series analysis. Serial correlation can lead to the underestimation of standard 
errors, thereby making t-values to be overestimated. Our VAR estimates are suspect if our model 
exhibits serial correlation.  We also highlighted in chapter 3 that the presence of serial correlation in 
the residuals is one indication that there could be an omitted important variable. Table 4.5 below is 
the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test with the null hypothesis stating that there is no serial 
correlation in our model. The test shows a value of about 1.015 for the observed R-squared, which is 
statistically insignificant at 5% level. Based on this finding, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation in our model. In other words, there is no serial correlation between the residuals 
and we do not have an important omitted variable in our model. 
 
Table 4.5 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for our 
model 
 
 
 
     
     F-statistic 0.173335     Prob. F(4,56) 0.9512 
Obs*R-squared 1.015060     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.9075 
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4.3.2 Normality test 
We do the normality test to make sure that the estimated residuals are normal. A model with 
residuals that are not normally distributed cannot produce efficient estimates. Figure 4.1 below 
shows the Jarque-Bera test for normality, with a value of about 5.05, which is statistically 
insignificant at 5% level. Based on this test we do not reject the null hypothesis which states that the 
model is normal. In other words, the residuals in our model are normally distributed, and this is 
desirable in making our estimates efficient and unbiased. 
Figure 4.1 Normality test 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1992Q2 2012Q4
Observations 83
Mean       5.27e-13
Median   0.273741
Maximum  10.53868
Minimum -12.35189
Std. Dev.   4.558607
Skewness  -0.541486
Kurtosis   3.536369
Jarque-Bera  5.050969
Probability  0.080020
 
4.3.3 Heteroskedasticity test 
Heteroskedasticity means that residuals do not have a constant variance. This results in a model 
having diﬀerent probability distributions. We use the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test to test for 
heteroskedasticity. Based on the test in table 4.6, with an observed R-squared of about 17.95, which 
follows a Chi-square probability, we cannot reject at 5% level of significance the null hypothesis that 
our model has no heteroskedasticity. In other words, the residuals in our model are constant, and 
this is desirable in rendering our estimates efficient. 
Table 4.6 Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
 
     
     F-statistic 0.752450     Prob. F(22,60) 0.7669 
Obs*R-squared 17.94779     Prob. Chi-Square(22) 0.7091 
Scaled explained SS 11.89433     Prob. Chi-Square(22) 0.9595 
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4.3.4 Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial 
As we discussed in chapter 3, VAR models need to be tested for stability in order for their estimates 
to be credible. Figure 4.2 below shows that all the reported inverse roots of the AR polynomial have 
roots with modulus which are less than one and they lie within the unit circle. This indicates that our 
estimated VAR is stable and stationary. This is a very desirable result due to the fact that, if our VAR 
were not stable, results, such as the impulse response standard errors, would be invalid, thereby 
making the results and conclusions of our model unreliable.  
 
Figure 4.2 Inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial   
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4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We follow the standard practice in VAR analysis which requires us to report results on causality in 
the model, impulse responses and forecast error variance decomposition.  
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4.4.1 Causality 
In this section, we are interested in finding out whether the independent variables are useful in 
predicting the values of our dependent variable, which is real GDP. These variables include: the real 
primary fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, real trade as a percentage of GDP, real effective 
exchange rate, real short-term interest rate, exchange-rate regimes dummy and the 2011 structural 
break. Of particular interest, is to find out whether this relationship exists in both the short-run and 
the long-run. 
In chapter 3 we ascertained that the normal Granger causality test is not effective in multivariate 
models. As a result, we use the procedure suggested by Maddala & Kim (1998:297) of using the 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to determine causality for the short-run and the long-run. To 
determine short-run causality, a Wald-coefficient restriction test is undertaken using the joint lagged 
coefficient values of the independent the variables derived from the VECM model (excluding the 
coefficient of the error correction term). 
On the other hand, to determine long-run causality, the Error Correction Term (ECT) of the VECM 
model is used. If the ECT is statistically significant and its coefficient value is negative, it means that, 
in the long run, the independent variables can jointly predict the values of the dependent variable. 
4.4.1.1 Short-run causality test   
Table 4.7 below shows the results of the Wald-coefficient restriction test derived after running a 
VECM.  The null hypothesis in this test states that the dependent variable (real GDP) is in the short- 
run not jointly caused by all the independent variables, c(77) to c(100). Based on the statistical 
significance at 5% of the Chi-square value of 271.9875, we reject the null hypothesis that the 
independent variables [c (77) to c (100)] jointly cannot cause a short-run change in the dependent 
variable. In other words, our independent variables, jointly, can cause a short-run change in real 
GDP. This is a desirable result. 
 
Table 4.7 Wald-coefficient restriction test results 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Real GDP as caused by other variables  
    
    Test Statistic Value Df Probability 
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    F-statistic  11.33281 (24, 57)  0.0000 
Chi-square  271.9875  24  0.0000 
    
        
Null Hypothesis: C(77)=C(78)=C(79)=C(80)=C(81)=C(82)= 
        C(83)=C(84)=C(85)=C(86)=C(87)=C(88)=C(89)=C(90)= 
        C(91)=C(92)=C(93)=C(94)=C(95)=C(96)=C(97)=C(98)= 
        C(99)=C(100)=0 
  
4.4.1.2 Long-run causality test 
Table 4.8 below shows the regression involving real GDP as explained by the lagged coefficients of 
the other variables in our model. We obtained this regression from the VECM, which we ran. We are 
interested in coefficient 73, which corresponds to the Error Correction Term (ECT). As we stated 
earlier, this test is based on the statistical significance of the ECT.  The null hypothesis for this test is 
that the independent variables jointly cause the dependent variable in the long run. In order for the 
ECT to be accepted as a determinant of long-run causality in the VECM model, its coefficient must 
have a negative sign. From table 4.5, the ECT coefficient of about -2.54 has a correct sign, which is 
desirable. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant at 5% level. Our conclusion 
therefore, is that in the long-run, there is no causality from the independent variables to the 
dependent variable.  
Table 4.8 Vector Error Correction Model results for the ECT 
Dependent Variable: D(real GDP)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/24/13   Time: 19:01   
Sample (adjusted): 1992Q3 2012Q4  
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
D(real GDP) = C(73)*( F(-1) - 4.75019623249*X(-1) - 1.04059138528*O(-1) + 
        0.780286327946*B(-1) ) + C(74)*( T(-1) - 4.7261647684*X(-1) - 
        0.268526560153*O(-1) - 0.097226364125*B(-1) ) + C(75)*D(F(-1)) + 
        C(76)*D(F(-2)) + C(77)*D(F(-3)) + C(78)*D(F(-4)) + C(79)*D(T(-1)) + 
        C(80)*D(T(-2)) + C(81)*D(T(-3)) + C(82)*D(T(-4)) + C(83)*D(X(-1)) + 
        C(84)*D(X(-2)) + C(85)*D(X(-3)) + C(86)*D(X(-4)) + C(87)*D(O(-1)) + 
        C(88)*D(O(-2)) + C(89)*D(O(-3)) + C(90)*D(O(-4)) + C(91)*D(B(-1)) + 
        C(92)*D(B(-2)) + C(93)*D(B(-3)) + C(94)*D(B(-4)) + C(95)*DUMREG + 
        C(96)*DUM11   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
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     C(73) or Error Correction 
Term -2.54E-05 5.54E-05 -0.458245 0.6485 
C(74) -2.53E-05 9.89E-05 -0.255391 0.7993 
C(75) 0.000344 0.000750 0.458914 0.6480 
C(76) -0.000137 0.000844 -0.161919 0.8719 
C(77) 0.000674 0.000852 0.790882 0.4322 
C(78) 0.001640 0.000720 2.278041 0.0264 
C(79) -0.008392 0.029767 -0.281904 0.7790 
C(80) -0.034423 0.027967 -1.230848 0.2233 
C(81) 0.000381 0.028127 0.013548 0.9892 
C(82) -0.018567 0.030466 -0.609419 0.5446 
C(83) -9.03E-05 0.000288 -0.313504 0.7550 
C(84) -0.000229 0.000251 -0.910946 0.3661 
C(85) 6.88E-06 0.000211 0.032654 0.9741 
C(86) 5.62E-05 0.000142 0.395632 0.6938 
C(87) 0.842154 0.134229 6.273988 0.0000 
C(88) -0.173720 0.176822 -0.982457 0.3300 
C(89) 0.028957 0.182892 0.158327 0.8747 
C(90) -0.045461 0.156101 -0.291229 0.7719 
C(91) 1.70E-05 4.22E-05 0.402234 0.6890 
C(92) -6.46E-06 3.60E-05 -0.179152 0.8584 
C(93) 1.34E-05 3.09E-05 0.434186 0.6658 
C(94) -9.24E-06 2.68E-05 -0.344705 0.7316 
C(95) 0.003021 0.001533 1.970776 0.0535 
C(96) 0.000217 0.002946 0.073579 0.9416 
     
     R-squared 0.527462     Mean dependent var 0.007558 
Adjusted R-squared 0.340076     S.D. dependent var 0.006368 
S.E. of regression 0.005173     Akaike info criterion -7.451489 
Sum squared resid 0.001552     Schwarz criterion -6.747084 
Log likelihood 329.5111     Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.168681 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.944941    
     
     
4.4.2 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) analysis 
SVAR models are easily interpreted with Impulse Response Functions (IRFs). We are interested in 
investigating the short-run and long-run IRFs. In line with Boussard et al (2012:5), we take the short-
run to represent a time gap of one year (four quarters) from the time the fiscal shock first occurred, 
and the long-run as a period of three years (12 quarters) from the time the fiscal shock first took 
place.  
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In our interpretation of the IRFs, we take the procedure of reporting responses, using the 
‘cumulative impulse response measure’. Hereafter, we refer to the cumulative impulse response 
measure as the ‘cumulative response’ or ‘accumulated response’. The cumulative response analysis 
investigates the cumulative change in a variable, say real GDP over a given time horizon N, in 
response to cumulative changes in a variable like primary fiscal deficit over the same time horizon N.  
Since the economic stimulative effect of fiscal deficits, depends not only on the increase in fiscal 
deficits but also on other variables, we restate that we included in our model other variables that are 
most important in influencing the effectiveness of fiscal deficits in stimulating economic growth. The 
mechanism through which those variables influence the potency of fiscal deficits is incorporated in 
our analysis of the IRF results.  
4.4.2.1 Short and long- run cumulative response of real GDP to primary fiscal deficit 
We begin our analysis by investigating the short-run IRF for the relationship between the key 
variables in our model. In this relationship, we analyse the response of real GDP to a one standard 
deviation positive shock in the primary fiscal deficit. Results based on the accumulated response 
measures in figure 4.3 below indicate that, in the short-run, the response of real GDP to a one 
standard deviation positive shock in the primary fiscal deficit is negligible or zero.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Short run response of real GDP to primary fiscal deficit 
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
1 2 3 4
Accumulated Response of real GDP to Primary Fiscal Deficit
1 year period 
Since, in the above analysis, we find no significant change in real GDP to a change in the primary 
fiscal deficit, we can now state that there is a zero short-run response of real GDP to an increase in 
the primary fiscal deficit.   
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In the long-run, the IRF in figure 4.4 below shows that just as in the case of the short-run, the long- 
run response of real GDP to a one unit positive standard deviation shock in the primary fiscal deficit 
is almost zero.  
Figure 4.4 Long-run response of real GDP to primary fiscal deficit 
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The results show that the response of real GDP to the primary fiscal deficit is negligible. We can now 
state that there is a zero long-run response of real GDP to an increase in the primary fiscal deficit.  
Fiscal deficits lead to a positive effect on economic growth, our null hypothesis (H0). The alternative 
hypothesis (H1), states that a fiscal deficit has an effect on economic growth which is equal to or less 
than zero 
These results provide an answer to our research hypotheses which, once again, state as follows: 
Fiscal deficits lead to a positive effect on economic growth in South Africa, as the null hypothesis; 
and fiscal deficits in South Africa have an effect on economic growth which is equal to or less than 
zero, as the alternative hypothesis. 
Based on the above results, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that fiscal deficits are not 
effective in stimulating both short-run and long-run economic growth in South Africa. This 
conclusion is quite similar to findings established by other related studies on South Africa. Jooste et 
al (2001:1), using the same methodology as ours, conclude that fiscal deficits in South Africa have a 
negative effect sometimes and positive one at other times. Our results fall between the Jooste et al 
(2001:1) findings. In terms of the long-run impact, our results are consistent with those of Jooste et 
al (2001:1) who also find a negligible effect. Ocran (2009:14) finds a negligible effect of fiscal deficits 
on economic growth. Clearly, these findings bring questions to the potency of discretionary fiscal 
policy in South Africa. We find the following factors to be credible in explaining the impotency of 
discretionary fiscal policy in South Africa: 
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4.4.2.2 Short and long-run cumulative response of primary fiscal deficit to real GDP   
In this section, we analyse the state of automatic stabilisers in South Africa, and how it impacts the 
effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy. The state of automatic stabilisers in our model is captured 
by the response of the primary fiscal deficit to a change in real GDP. Our interest is more in 
establishing whether automatic stabilisers in South Africa are strong.  
Based on figure 4.5 below a one unit positive standard deviation shock in real GDP causes a rise in 
the primary fiscal deficit. This outcome portrays a scenario of small or weak automatic stabilisers in 
South Africa. If automatic stabilisers were strong, an increase in real GDP should have been 
associated with a fall in the primary fiscal deficit. Interestingly, our study is not the first one to make 
such a claim. Swanepoel & Schoeman (2003:566) find no significant evidence of automatic stabilisers 
in South Africa.  
Suescun (2007:29) points out that, small fiscal automatic stabilisers tend not to be responsive to 
cyclical conditions and thus, have a weak anti-cyclical capacity to business fluctuations. Hoppner 
(2002:16) points out that, weak automatic stabilisers render discretionary fiscal policy ineffective in 
smoothening out business cycles. See also Swanepoel & Schoeman (2003:572). Discretionary fiscal 
policy works well when it is reinforced by automatic stabilisers. This is because, with strong 
automatic stabilisers, spending through transfer payments increases, while taxes automatically fall 
during economic downturns. This helps to stimulate the economy. 
In view of the fact that our study finds weak short-run automatic stabilisers, we make the claim that 
this could explain why we obtained a zero response in economic growth to changes in fiscal deficits.   
Figure 4.5 Short-run response of primary fiscal deficit to real GDP 
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Accumulated Response of Primary Fiscal Deficit to real GDP
1 year period 
In the long-run, we still find that automatic stabilisers are weak. Figure 4.6 below portrays weak 
long-run automatic stabilisers in South Africa. For the same reasons we gave above, we believe this 
 
 
 
 
 65 
 
could explain why we obtained a zero long-run response of economic growth to changes in fiscal 
deficits.  
Figure 4.6 Long-run response of primary fiscal deficit to real GDP 
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Accumulated Response of Primary Fiscal Deficit to real GDP
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4.4.2.3 Short and long-run cumulative response of trade as a % of GDP to primary deficit 
The next analysis refers to the extent to which the degree of openness to trade can offset the 
economic stimulative effect of fiscal deficits. We discussed in chapter 2 that more open economies 
render fiscal policy ineffective because fiscal stimuli may be leaked out of the economy through 
imports. See among others Spilimbergo et al (2009:2) and Ilzetzki et al (2010:6). 
We use trade as a percentage of GDP to assess whether fiscal deficits are leaked out of the economy 
through increased imports. An increase in trade as a percentage of GDP due to a positive shock in 
the primary fiscal deficit indicates that the fiscal deficit is leaked out of the economy through 
imports. We are aware that trade as a percentage of GDP can increase due to an increase in exports, 
as well.  However, we contend that, if trade as a percentage of GDP increases due to the rise in 
exports, this effect should lead to a positive impact on real GDP. Failure to do so makes us claim that 
the increase in trade as a percentage of GDP emanates from the rise in imports.  
Figure 4.7 below shows the short-run response of trade as a percentage of GDP to a one unit 
positive standard deviation shock in the primary fiscal deficit. We find a positive IRF. We claim that 
this outcome is attributed to the leakage of the fiscal deficit through increased imports. Because of 
that, the economic stimulative effect of fiscal deficits was offset by leakages through increased 
imports. This possibly explains why we obtained a zero response of economic growth to changes in 
fiscal deficits. 
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Figure 4.7 Short-run response of trade as a % of GDP to primary fiscal deficit 
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
1 2 3 4
Accumulated Response of Trade as a % of GDP to Primary Fiscal Deficit
1 year period 
In terms of the long-run relationship for these variables, figure 4.8 below reports a positive 
cumulative response. Based on this response result, we contend that the long-run economic 
stimulative effect of the primary fiscal deficit was offset by the leakages through increased imports. 
We believe that this could explain why we obtained a zero response of economic growth to changes 
in fiscal deficits. 
Figure 4.8 Long-run response of trade as a % of GDP to primary fiscal deficit 
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4.4.2.4 Short and long-run cumulative response of the real interest rate to the primary deficit 
In this section, we assess whether fiscal deficits lead to the rise in interest rates. Perhaps, the most 
cogent argument against fiscal deficits, particularly by the neoclassical economists, is that they lead 
to an increase in interest rates which then dampen or crowd-out private investment. The crowding-
out of private investment offsets the economic stimulative effect of fiscal deficits.  Interestingly, the 
new Keynesians, like Eisner (1989:89), acknowledge that fiscal deficits do raise interest rates. 
However, to them, fiscal deficits are important for improving business confidence, such that, 
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regardless of the level of interest rate, private investment would still occur, guaranteeing an increase 
in GDP.  
From the two schools of thought, figure 4.9 below helps to ascertain the claim which conforms to 
our empirical findings. From figure 4.9, a one unit short run positive standard deviation shock in the 
primary fiscal deficit leads to a positive change in the short-term real interest rate. So far, both 
schools of thought are correct in their predictions. However, we argue that the neoclassical 
prediction is consistent with our findings, that is, there is a rise in interest rates which is associated 
with a fall in real GDP. On the other hand, the new Keynesian prediction fails on the basis that the 
rise in the interest rate is, in our case, not associated with an increase in real GDP. 
Our conclusion is that, the short-run economic stimulative effect of the primary fiscal deficit was 
offset by the dampening effect of the rise in interest rates on private investment. This could explain 
why we obtained a zero response of economic growth to changes in fiscal deficits.  
Figure 4.9 Short-run response of the short-term real interest rate to primary fiscal deficit 
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Accumulated Response of Short term real interest rate to Primary Fiscal Deficit
1 year period 
In terms of the long-run relationship for these variables, figure 4.10 below shows an increase in the 
short-term real interest rate to a one unit positive standard deviation shock in the primary fiscal 
deficit. We conclude that the long-run economic stimulative effect of fiscal deficits was offset by the 
crowding-out of private investment. This could potentially explain why we found a long-run fiscal 
multiplier which is less than one.  
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Figure 4.10 Long-run response of short-term real interest rate to primary deficit 
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4.4.2.5 Short and long-run cumulative response of real effective exchange-rate to real interest 
rate 
In this section, we make an analysis that fiscal deficits lead to the rise in interest rates. This rise in 
interest rates creates room for the appreciation of the real exchange-rate, which then causes a trade 
deficit, and hampers GDP. In chapter 2, we made reference to the Mundell-Fleming framework 
which posits that fiscal policy is ineffective in economies where capital is mobile. The justification for 
this argument was that fiscal deficits lead to the rise in interest rates, which we have already 
established in the section above. This rise in interest rates leads to increased capital inflows, which 
cause the real appreciation of the exchange rate. The appreciation of the real effective exchange- 
rate leads to a trade deficit, in addition to the fiscal deficit, ending in what is called the “twin deficit 
hypothesis” which we mentioned in chapter 2. These reactions offset the economic stimulative 
effect of fiscal deficits.  
Focusing on the results from our SVAR, figure 4.11 below shows the response of the real effective 
exchange-rate to a one unit short run positive standard deviation shock to the short-term real 
interest rate. There is a noticeable amount of appreciation of the real effective exchange-rate, 
although not throughout the entire short-term period. This appreciation of the real effective 
exchange-rate could have led to a trade deficit, thereby offsetting the short-run economic 
stimulative effect of the fiscal deficit. Barro (1981:1109) reaches this same conclusion about the 
economic effect of fiscal policy. We, therefore, believe this could explain why we obtained a zero 
short-run fiscal impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. 
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 Figure 4.11 Short-run response of real effective exchange-rate to short-term real interest rate 
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Accumulated Response of real Exchange rate to Short term real interest rate
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As for the long-run relationship for these variables, figure 4.12 below shows that the change in the 
real effective exchange-rate, due to a one unit positive standard deviation shock, is almost 
negligible. We conclude that the relationship between these variables had a negligible effect on the 
long-run effect of fiscal deficits. 
Figure 4.12 Long-run response of real effective exchange-rate to short-term real interest rate 
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4.4.2.6 Short and long-run cumulative response of short-term real interest rate to real GDP 
In this section, we are interested in assessing the impact of the monetary policy framework of 
inflation-targeting on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Christiano et al (2009:80) and Spilimbergo et 
al (2009:3) argued that fiscal stimuli are a failure under inflation targeting monetary policy. This is 
because, under inflation-targeting, the monetary authorities adjust the short-term interest rate in 
response to deviations of GDP and inflation from their steady-state levels (Jooste et al, 2012:7). In 
this case, the active role of monetary policy to maintain a certain desired level of inflation or output 
through changes in the interest rate might offset the economic stimulative effect of fiscal deficits.  
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The SARB follows this approach. Because of that, we expect that an increase in real GDP should 
result in an increase in the short-term real interest rate in order for the SARB to maintain inflation 
and GDP in their steady state. In other words, we expect an offsetting effect of the economic 
stimulative effect of fiscal deficits through the raising of interest rates by the SARB. 
 Figure 4.13 below, confirms the active role of the SARB. The short-term real interest rate rises due 
to a one unit positive standard deviation shock in real GDP. We argue that this active role of the 
SARB had an offsetting economic stimulative effect of the primary fiscal deficit. Thus, inflation-
targeting monetary policy of the SARB could have contributed towards the ineffectiveness of fiscal 
deficits on economic growth.  
Figure 4.13 Short-run response of the short-term real interest rate to real GDP 
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Accumulated Response of Short term real interest rate to real GDP
1 year period 
In the long-run, we find results which do not confirm our expectations, as can be seen in figure 4.14 
below. We see a negative response of the short-term real interest rate to an increase in real GDP. 
This result reveals that the SARB was more interested in the continued stimulation of long-run 
economic growth. This could also explain why South Africa’s inflation rate over the years has been 
bordering the upper limit of the targeted range.  
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Figure 4.14 Long-run response of short-term real interest rate to real GDP 
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4.4.2.7 Short and long-run cumulative response of primary deficit to short-term real interest rate  
In this section, we are interested in making one attempt of assessing the consistency of relationships 
in our model. We do so by analysing the response of the primary fiscal deficit to an increase in the 
short-term real interest. In chapter 3, we mentioned that one of the reasons we ordered the interest 
rate variable after the primary fiscal deficit variable was to assess whether the primary fiscal deficit 
can react to interest rate changes. Since the primary fiscal deficit excludes interest payments, if our 
estimates are consistent, it means that this variable should not react to changes in the short-term 
real interest rate. 
Figure 4.15 below demonstrates that the primary fiscal deficit has a negligible short-run response to 
a one unit positive standard deviation shock in the short-term real interest rate. This result is in 
accordance with what we expected. It is an indication of consistency in our model. 
Figure 4.15 Short-run response of primary fiscal deficit to short-term real interest rate  
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Accumulated Response of Primary Fiscal Deficit to Short term real interest rate
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In the long-run, figure 4.16 below shows a slight negative response of the primary fiscal deficit to a 
one unit positive standard deviation shock to the short-term real interest rate. This result is contrary 
to what we expected. However, undertaking an experiment of testing the consistency of the 
estimates from data series in the manner we do, comes at a risk. This is because national accounts 
data are never objective enough, and thus, will often fail the type of consistency test that we have 
just applied.   
Figure 4.16 Long-run response of primary fiscal deficit to short-term real interest rate 
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4.4.3 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) 
In consonance with the standard practice when showing findings for VAR models, we also report 
results from the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD). Once again, this reports the strength 
of a given shock in explaining the changes that occur in another variable. This is necessary as it helps 
us to gauge the relevance of a given variable in influencing another variable. It also helps us to assess 
the consistency of the analyses we made under the IRFs.  We report the short-run and long-run 
FEVD for each relationship using the same graph. As before, the short-run is a period up to 4 
quarters (1 year), while the long-run is a period of 12 quarters (3 years) and beyond. A tabular FEVD 
is provided at the end of this section particularly to analyse the variables that had the greatest 
influence in offsetting the economic stimulative effect of fiscal deficits.   
4.4.3.1 Short and long-run real GDP variance due to primary fiscal deficit 
In this section, we are interested in finding out the extent to which the primary fiscal deficit can 
influence changes in real GDP. As can be seen in figure 4.17, the primary fiscal deficit has almost a 
0% influence on real GDP, both in the short-run and long-run. This tallies well with the results which 
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we reported using the IRFs, where real GDP remained zero after an increase in the primary fiscal 
deficit. It is, therefore, correct for us to conclude that the primary fiscal deficit in South Africa has no 
stimulative effect on real GDP. 
Figure 4.17 Real GDP variance due to primary fiscal deficit 
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4.4.3.2 Short and long-run primary fiscal deficit variance due to real GDP 
According to figure 4.18 below, real GDP explains over 35% of variations taking place in the primary 
fiscal deficit. As we established when we analysed the IRFs, this variation relates to the increase in 
the primary fiscal deficit, which explains the case of very weak automatic stabilisers. As can be seen 
in the figure below, our results are almost in line with those of Swanepoel & Schoeman (2003:256) 
who find no evidence of the presence of automatic stabilisers in South Africa.  Because of that, we 
once again, believe that weak automatic stabilisers could explain why we found a zero short-run and 
long-run response of economic growth to changes in fiscal deficits.  
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Figure 4.18 Primary fiscal deficit variance due to real GDP 
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4.4.3.3 Short and long-run trade as a % of GDP variance due to primary fiscal deficit  
In this section, we want to assess if the primary fiscal deficit has an influence in the increase in trade 
as a share of GDP. In our context, we have already established that the increase in trade as a 
percentage of GDP may have possibly been as a consequence of the primary fiscal deficit being 
leaked out through imports. In analysing the FEVD, we therefore look at the extent to which the 
primary fiscal deficit might have led to leakages through increased imports.  
Figure 4.19 below shows a positive contribution of the primary fiscal deficit towards leakages 
through increased imports. This is in line with the analysis we made under the IRF analysis. Our 
conclusion is that, this outcome could explain why we found a zero short-run and long-run impact of 
fiscal deficits on economic growth. 
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Figure 4.19 Trade as a % of GDP variance due to primary fiscal deficit 
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4.4.3.4 Short and long-run short term real interest rate variance due to primary fiscal deficit 
In this section, we analyse the extent to which the primary fiscal deficit could explain the rise in 
interest rates, thereby, possibly causing what is commonly known as the crowding-out of private 
investment.  
Figure 4.20 below shows that a shock in the primary fiscal deficit does contribute about 8% of the 
rise in the short-term real interest rate. Once again, this is consistent with our arguments under the 
IRF analysis that an increase in the primary fiscal deficit leads to a rise in the short-term real interest 
rate. Since our study finds a zero change in real GDP, we once again, claim that the economic 
stimulative effect of the primary fiscal deficit could have been offset by the dampening effect of the 
rise in the short-term real interest rate, both in the short-run and long-run.  
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Figure 4.20 Short-term real interest rate variance due to primary fiscal deficit 
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4.4.3.5 Short and long-run real effective exchange-rate variance due to real interest rate  
In this section, we are interested in assessing the extent to which the short-term real interest rate 
could have influenced changes in the real effective exchange-rate. This assessment comes as a result 
of the Mundell-Fleming argument, made above, that fiscal deficits lead to a rise in interest rates. If 
capital is mobile in the economy, this could lead to an increase in capital inflows which then causes 
an appreciation of the real exchange-rate.  
Figure 4.21 below, shows that a shock in the primary fiscal deficit has a positive contribution towards 
the appreciation of the real effective exchange-rate, both in the short-run and long-run. This is in 
line with our analysis under the IRFs where we established that an increase in the short-term real 
interest resulting from a fiscal stimulus would lead to the appreciation of the real effective 
exchange- rate. The appreciation of the real effective exchange-rate could have led to a trade deficit, 
thereby thwarting real GDP. As a result we are led to conclude that the economic stimulative effect 
of the fiscal deficit could have been offset by the increase in the trade deficit emanating from the 
appreciation of the real effective exchange-rate.  
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Figure 4.21 Real effective exchange rate variance due to short-term real interest rate  
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4.4.3.6 Short and long-run short-term real interest rate variance due to real GDP 
Once again, South Africa pursues an inflation-targeting monetary policy. As we established earlier, 
the SARB adjusts the short-term real interest rate in response to deviations of real GDP and inflation 
from their steady state. In our case, we are interested in finding out the extent to which real GDP 
influences the SARB to change the short-term real interest rate.  
From figure 4.22, we see that the percentage impact of real GDP on changes that take place in the 
short-term real interest rate is positive, both in the short-run and long-run. This implies that, real 
GDP contains information upon which the SARB bases its inflation-targeting monetary policy. As we 
mentioned earlier, the SARB reacts to this information by changing the short-term real interest rate, 
as can be seen in figure 4.22 below. We therefore conclude that the zero response of real GDP to 
changes in fiscal deficits we obtained could be attributed to the offsetting effects of the SARB’s need 
to comply with the inflation-targeting monetary policy.  
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Figure 4.22 Short-term real interest rate variance due to real GDP 
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4.4.3.7 Short and long-run primary fiscal deficit variance due to short-term real interest rate 
Finally, in this section, we attempt to assess the consistency of our estimates through gauging the 
extent to which the short-term real interest rate can influence the primary fiscal deficit. Since we 
calculate the primary fiscal deficit by subtracting interest payments, we expect that the short-term 
real interest rate should have a 0% influence on the primary fiscal deficit.  
Figure 4.23 below shows exactly what we expected. This proves that our estimates between the 
primary fiscal deficit and the short-term real interest rate are consistent. In addition, our FEVD 
results help us to clarify the unclear findings we obtained under the IRF analysis where there was a 
slight response of the primary fiscal deficit to a change in the short-term real interest rate.  
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Figure 4.23 Primary fiscal deficit variance due to short-term real interest rate 
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4.4.3.8 Variance decomposition table for real GDP 
In this segment, we are interested in finding out the variables which had the greatest influence in 
the variations of real GDP. The variables that had the greatest influence are taken to have had a 
dominant offsetting effect on the stimulative effort of the primary fiscal deficit. Table 4.6 below 
shows percentage contributions of each variable shock towards changes in real GDP at different 
forecast periods.  
Table 4.9 Variance decomposition of real GDP: 
       
Period S.E.      Deficit Trade as % GDP 
Effective 
exchange rate real GDP Interest rate 
       
        1  0.004967  0.088613  5.225305  0.004531  94.68155  0.000000 
 2  0.009877  0.023607  2.631257  0.159388  97.16347  0.022281 
 3  0.014398  0.011601  1.238955  0.114694  98.62114  0.013608 
 4  0.018589  0.020282  2.451430  0.096163  97.41165  0.020473 
 5  0.022722  0.018786  5.839806  0.083378  94.03788  0.020152 
 6  0.026651  0.023880  9.252071  0.065732  90.63263  0.025688 
 7  0.030347  0.038119  11.95656  0.051668  87.92511  0.028544 
 8  0.033757  0.053688  13.88540  0.063217  85.96785  0.029839 
 9  0.036930  0.062067  15.29862  0.089850  84.52219  0.027279 
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 10  0.039943  0.064886  16.41420  0.122034  83.37496  0.023916 
 11  0.042866  0.062052  17.35487  0.153523  82.40878  0.020767 
 12  0.045714  0.056842  18.13869  0.181079  81.60507  0.018320 
 13  0.048496  0.050990  18.78876  0.205007  80.93890  0.016345 
 14  0.051209  0.045743  19.33151  0.227530  80.38053  0.014683 
 15  0.053852  0.042291  19.80048  0.247265  79.89666  0.013299 
 16  0.056431  0.041540  20.22654  0.263539  79.45623  0.012147 
 
In table 4.9 above, we notice that real GDP had the greatest short-run influence on itself, explaining 
about 97% of fluctuations in itself. It is followed by Trade as a percentage of GDP, with about 2% 
contribution. After that, the real effective exchange rate follows. The last ones are the short term 
real interest rate and the primary fiscal deficit.  
In the long run, the influence of real GDP on itself declines, while the influence of trade as a 
percentage of GDP, real effective exchange-rate, primary fiscal deficit and short-term real interest 
rate increase, in that order.  
We can claim, therefore, that the economic stimulative effect of fiscal deficits was offset by the 
influence of other variables. The influence of those variables can be ranked, starting with the 
strongest, as follows:  trade as a percentage of GDP, which captures leakages through imports; real 
effective exchange-rate, which captures the trade dampening effect of the appreciation of the 
exchange-rate; fiscal deficit, and the short-term real interest rate, which captures the crowding out 
of private investment.   
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
We undertook this chapter in order to test the research hypotheses: Fiscal deficits lead to a positive 
effect on economic growth, as our null hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis, on the other hand, 
stated that fiscal deficits have an effect on economic growth which is equal to or less than zero. We 
used macroeconomic time series data ranging from 1991 to 2012 to apply an SVAR model. We 
implemented all the necessary measures required to ensure that our series were made stationary 
and suitable for our SVAR model. Based on the IRF and FEVD analyses, we rejected the null 
hypothesis that fiscal deficits in South Africa lead to a positive effect on economic growth. We, 
therefore, establish that fiscal deficits in South Africa generate a zero short-run and long-run impact 
on economic growth, and conclude that they are not effective in stimulating economic growth. We 
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analysed the different factors that could have led to this outcome. Basically, these factors explain 
how the economic stimulative effect of fiscal deficits was offset.  They include:  weak automatic 
stabilisers, openness to trade, real appreciation of the exchange-rate, crowding-out of private 
investment, and the fact that the SARB pursues an inflation-targeting monetary policy. These 
findings are efficient and reliable, based on the success in the diagnostic checks we undertook, 
which included the residual diagnostic tests and model stability test.  Our findings are not very 
different from those of similar studies on South Africa. Jooste et al (2012:1) find that the short-run 
fiscal deficit impact can be positive sometimes and other times negative. Our long-run fiscal 
multiplier is exactly as found by Jooste et al (2012:1) where real GDP does not respond to an 
increase in the primary fiscal deficit. Ocran (2009:14) finds that fiscal deficits have an insignificant 
impact on economic growth.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  
This study set out to investigate the short-run and long-run effectiveness of fiscal deficits in 
stimulating South Africa’s economic growth.  Determination of whether fiscal deficits are effective 
was based on the analysis of the impulse response functions and the forecast error variance 
decomposition estimated through an SVAR model.  
Before the model was estimated, a literature review in chapter 2 was provided. In this chapter, we 
discovered that there is no consensus among different schools of thought regarding the 
effectiveness of fiscal deficits in stimulating economic growth. Whereas the new Keynesians argue 
that fiscal deficits stimulate economic growth, the neoclassical and Ricardian theorists disagree. The 
disagreements filtered into our literature on empirical findings about the effectiveness of fiscal 
deficits in stimulating growth. We discovered that empirical evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal 
deficits is mixed, regardless of which fiscal shock one uses. It can be positive, negative or zero.   
We then discussed the methodology to use in estimating the effect of fiscal deficits in chapter 3. We 
substantiated the selection of the SVAR system for the analysis of the results in our study. Basically, 
the SVAR is easier to analyse and provides better estimates for economies susceptible to poor 
quality data such as developing countries, compared to the large scale simultaneous models.  In this 
chapter, we presented the types of time series data that would be used for analysis and discussed 
how to resolve the problem of unit roots which is normally a source of concern in these types of 
data. Arising from the argument that one of the most critical challenges of using SVAR models is how 
to apply identification assumptions, we showed how the recursive identification method suggested 
by Sims (1980) could help in addressing this challenge in our study.  
In chapter 4, we applied all the econometric tools necessary to ensure that our series were 
satisfactory for use in estimating the SVAR. This implies that we chose the optimal lag length, used 
robust deterministic assumptions and ensured that our series were stationary. Our model passed all 
the residual diagnostic and stability tests, making our conclusions efficient and reliable. We reported 
our results using Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
(FEVD). Our results showed that fiscal deficits have a zero impact on economic growth. This led us to 
the conclusion that fiscal deficits are not effective in stimulating economic growth in South Africa. 
This arose due to the fact that the stimulative effect of fiscal deficits was offset by the crowding-out 
effect, small automatic stabilisers, leakages through increased imports, appreciation of the Rand and 
the inflation-targeting policy rule of the SARB.   
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